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Summary 
 
 
This interim report describes the progress of the nine ‘Trailblazer’ projects that received funds 
from the Social Enterprise Investment Fund in 2013 to investigate the feasibility of setting up 
Social Impact Bond (SIB) projects in health and social care in England.  The findings discussed in 
this report are based on a literature review of the SIB literature and on documentary analysis 
and qualitative interviews with key informants involved in UK SIB development undertaken 
between May and November 2014. 
 
The Trailblazers cover a variety of health and social care issues and are in different stages of 
development. As of December 2014, two projects were operational, and five projects were still 
in negotiation. Two Trailblazers will not become SIBs as one project has been fully funded by a 
public commissioner and the other was terminated before the contractual stage. This report 
details the diversity of models and approaches to SIB development across the nine Trailblazer 
projects. 
 
The literature review finds that little empirical data about SIBs has been produced to date. 
There is a much larger academic, policy and ‘grey’ literature focused on the theoretical impacts 
of SIBs in funding and providing public services. Early empirical fieldwork data align closely with 
the existent literature.   
 
Key findings from the documentary analysis and interviews in the nine Trailblazers are that SIBs 
require complex negotiations amongst multiple actors and organisations that have not worked 
together before. There may often be delays in agreeing SIB contracts and accessing requisite 
development funding to aid SIB development. SIB negotiations currently appear to have high 
transaction costs. Some health and social care SIBs are motivated by a desire to develop 
innovative services, whilst others focus on scaling up established service models delivered 
elsewhere or at smaller scale. SIBs have a significant impact upon how activity and outcome 
data are collected – frequently leading to more extensive and considered techniques of both 
data capture and analysis. However, informants expressed concerns around how to attribute 
outcomes to services. Learning points from two of the first operational SIBs in health and social 
care include, firstly, the importance of establishing clarity of data requirements and then 
building internal or external capacity to do this; and secondly, the importance of extensive 
collaborative working between all parties to ensure operational success despite the 
requirement to tender services.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Interest in Pay-for-Performance (P4P) mechanisms, linking part of remuneration to achieving 
certain performance targets, has recently grown in health care and other public services, 
especially in the UK. For instance, payment-for-performance (P4P), also sometimes termed 
‘payment by results’ in England, was mentioned 15 times in the UK Government’s 2011 Open 
Public Services White Paper. The term ‘payment by results’ can be confusing as ‘Payment by 
Results’ is also the term used in the English NHS to refer to the prospective payment for 
hospital care based on activity, not on performance targets.  
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) have been introduced even more recently as a new type of P4P 
contract to fund the delivery of public services frequently through third sector organisations. 
These contracts involve three parties: public sector commissioners; social investors; and service 
providers, and often a fourth party, an intermediary. In a nutshell, in a typical SIB contract, 
public sector commissioners partner with private for-profit or Third Sector social investors to 
fund interventions that seek to tackle (usually complex) social problems (e.g. associated with 
rough sleeping, frail older people with multiple long term conditions, youth offending, etc.). 
More specifically, charities and/or private investors cover the upfront costs necessary to set up 
the interventions implemented by service providers, while the commissioner commits to pay 
rewards if pre-defined desired outcomes are later reached.  Intermediaries are often involved 
in developing the intervention, providing advisory services (intermittent or through the life of 
the contract) and liaising with investors to secure project funding.  In many cases, a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV), or a subsidiary company, is established whose operations are used for 
the exclusive acquisition and financing of the service, and to receive investments and make 
outcome payments.  The SPV can also issue contracts to service providers to deliver the 
intervention. 
 
The term Social Impact Bond can be confusing as these contracts are not really bonds, since the 
return on capital or investment is not guaranteed.   If they were bonds in the accepted sense, 
investors should be guaranteed to get their initial investment back at the end of the defined 
period, with any interest in proportion to the effectiveness of the intervention funded with 
their investment.  Instead, Social Finance, a prominent intermediary in the SIB field in the UK, 
describes a SIB as “a hybrid instrument with some characteristics of a bond (e.g. an upper limit 
on returns) but also characteristics of equity with a return related to performance” (Social 
Finance 2014). The fact that there is no guaranteed return on investment is perhaps one reason 
why most of the investors in SIBs so far have been charities or foundations, often with pre-
existing commitment(s) to a particular area of social service. Such schemes can appear simply 
as a new mechanism for public commissioners to shift the risk of funding interventions that 
might not be successful onto other players.  
 
In the more ambitious SIB schemes, the pay-out to investors is, in theory, derived, wholly or in 
part, from savings to government if the intervention succeeds (e.g. if people are helped back to 
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work and cease to be reliant on welfare benefits) rather than on the basis of an estimation of 
the value to society of the improved outcomes – as happens in less ambitious SIB schemes. The 
government commissioner agrees to pay a proportion of any savings to the investors as profit 
and/or return on capital (returns on their investment). 
 
Under a SIB mechanism, there is no requirement for the service provider to enter into a 
performance-related contract. This means that unlike in P4P schemes, the risk does not have to 
be borne by service providers, but is borne by the investors instead. Nevertheless, in practice, 
some SIB schemes include a P4P component for service providers as well. Ultimately, even 
though there might be an attempt from the public funder to shift some of the risk to private 
investors, the government is likely to bear at least some risk, for example, if the SIB-funded 
intervention fails or makes things worse and clients of those interventions end up using other 
public services more. 
 
SIBs have been widely promoted in the last five or so years in England for many reasons. In 
particular, SIBs are presented as a new financing mechanism that:  
 
- “[attracts] new investment” from private social investors (Social Finance website 2014) 
since it “promises returns to private investors if social objectives are met” (Economist 
2013).  
- “remove[s] the risk that interventions do not deliver outcomes from the public sector” 
(Social Finance website 2014) and “enable[s] a re-allocation of risk between the two 
sectors” (Rotheroe et al 2013). 
- allows the implementation of new and innovative programs that have potential for 
success, but often have trouble securing government funding and thereby “fund[s] 
innovation in service delivery” (Rotheroe et al 2013). 
 
England is emerging as a pioneer in the use of private finance to deliver social services through 
SIBs. The first SIB was launched at the Peterborough Prison in 2010, and SIBs have since been 
presented as the answer to some of England’s most intractable social problems including, for 
example, recidivism, youth unemployment and substance abuse (HM Government 2009). As 
health and social care systems face the challenges of rising demand (due to an ageing 
population) and severely constrained resources, social investors and financial intermediaries 
see the sector as one of the main areas of growth and opportunities. The demand for social 
investment in the UK has been estimated as likely to reach £1billion by 2016, a third of which is 
expected to be in the field of health and social care (Boston Consulting Group 2012).  
 
The simultaneous introduction of such an innovative funding mechanism and entry of new 
actors (i.e. social investors and financial intermediaries) in the field of health and social care is 
likely to present opportunities for the future financing of services, but might also present 
potential risks associated with the contracting out of public services, for example, in relation to 
the sustainability of service delivery and what happens if ventures ‘fail’. There is also the issue 
of the transaction costs as SIBs appear more complex than traditional mechanisms with the 
added risks associated with complexity in financing. In this context, it is important to critically 
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assess the development of the first SIBs in the area of health and social care, in order to 
contribute to the research literature focused on the value-added and feasibility of further SIB 
models in health and social care, and to inform the way in which they might be designed and 
managed in the future. 
 
Evaluation 
 
In the field of health and social care, nine projects (briefly described below in Table 1.1, see 
Table 4.1 for a more detailed description of all projects), collectively known as the SIB 
‘Trailblazers’, received seed funding from the Government’s Social Enterprise Investment Fund 
(SEIF) in 2013. This was to undertake an analysis whether to implement a SIB and, if so, to set it 
up. The SEIF was originally set up in 2007 by the Department of Health in order to facilitate the 
development of the social investment market in health and social care.   In many cases SEIF 
funding allowed projects, often led by service providers at the invitation of commissioners, to 
gain access to intermediaries, new actors offering advisory services, not unlike management 
consultancies with specialist knowledge in SIB development, who have provided assistance in 
the design and negotiation of potential SIBs.  Thus in most cases, intermediaries have been 
working with providers and commissioners to share the development work involved in the SIB 
as far as is possible within the requirement to tender SIB-funded services.   
 
The Essex Multi-Systemic Therapy SIB did not receive SEIF funding but had received cross-
Government funding, including from Department of Health, prior to the SEIF awards and is thus 
included in this report for completeness and learning. At the time of writing, the nine projects 
in Table 1.1 have advanced to varying degrees, At the time of the report, just two projects are 
operational SIBs, five remain in negotiation, while one has been wholly funded by the public 
commissioner and one other will not proceed to become a SIB due to lack of commissioner 
support. The Trailblazers vary in their geographical location, scale or type of interventions to be 
delivered (e.g. from providing innovative interventions to support isolated older people in the 
community to scaling up proven programmes targeting delinquent youths).  
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Table 1.1: Overview of 9 SIB Trailblazers and Essex, as at December 2014 
 
Project Objective Progress 
Sandwell Integrated community-based end of life 
services 
Under negotiation 
Cornwall Early interventions for a cohort of 1000 frail 
older people with LTCs at risk of emergency 
admission. 
Under negotiation 
East Lancashire Provision of patient-specific tailored health 
and social care interventions to reduce 
isolation, unemployment and poor quality of 
life  
Will not be a SIB 
(government 
funded) 
Leeds Setting up a 75-bed nursing facility and 
creating a community of care delivering 
nursing care to a mix of high-needs people. 
Project abandoned 
Manchester Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care for 
Adolescents programme (MTFC-A) providing 
behavioural interventions for 95 children 
aged 11 to 14 years  
Signed and in 
progress 
Newcastle Improve the self-management of long-term 
conditions through social prescribing (i.e. 
non-medical interventions in the local 
community to foster sustained healthy 
behaviours)  
Under negotiation 
Shared Lives 
Alternative to care homes for people in need 
of support: carers share their lives and often 
their homes with those they support 
Under negotiation 
Thames Reach Personalised service pathway for a cohort of 
415 entrenched rough sleepers. 
Signed and in 
progress 
Worcester Early intervention and self-care programmes 
for isolated individuals.  
Under negotiation 
Essex1 Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST), which 
delivers family therapy in the home through 
highly qualified therapists delivered to 380 
children on the edge of care or custody 
Signed and in 
progress 
1 The Essex SIB is included here for completeness and learning but is not a SIB trailblazer and is being evaluated 
fully by the Office for Public Management. 
 
The Department of Health’s Policy Research Programme has commissioned an independent 
evaluation of these Trailblazer projects from the Policy Innovation Research Unit at the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, in partnership with RAND Europe, to explore their 
potential benefits and costs in health and social care.   
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Aims and objectives 
 
The objectives of the evaluation of the Trailblazers are to: 
 
(1) Develop a conceptual framework to help understand the potential role and effects of 
SIBs compared with other approaches to paying for public services. This component will 
help orientate the subsequent empirical parts of the project. 
(2) Describe and assess the development of the nine SIB Trailblazers in order to identify 
obstacles and enabling factors in finalising SIB contracts. 
(3) Describe and characterise the signed SIB contracts in order to unpack the implications in 
terms of incentives and risk-sharing arrangements for the different parties 
(4) Assess, if feasible, in a second phase, whether and how the SIB contract mechanism 
enables achievement of better outcomes than alternative funding mechanisms, and if so, 
to explore the ways through which such benefits appear.  
 
 
The evaluation comprises four components: 
 
1) Conceptual work that builds on existing economics, public finance and public 
administration literature, as well as on a description of existing SIBs, to develop a 
typology of the different possible ways in which SIBs can be designed, in order to assess 
their theoretical implications in terms of the incentives faced by providers, investors and 
service commissioners, together with the risk-sharing arrangements. This component of 
the work will also seek to compare SIBs to other approaches to funding health and social 
services.  
2) Building on this analysis, the project describes the way in which the projects have 
progressed towards the design of a SIB, and what challenges have emerged during that 
phase. This work relies on document review and qualitative interviews with key 
stakeholders from each of the three parties involved in the preparatory phase of SIBs 
(private investors, service providers and commissioners). The research will also seek to 
quantify the amount of work and time involved in this preparatory phase of SIBs, in 
order to quantify transaction costs. 
3) The third component will comprise an in-depth analysis of the SIB contracts that are 
signed as the project progresses. It will rely mostly on the analysis of the contractual 
documents signed by all parties, and possibly on interviews with service providers and 
private investors to get a more precise understanding of the contractual arrangements, 
as well as some general understanding of services delivered. The information obtained 
will allow us to unpack the implications in terms of incentives and risk-sharing 
arrangements for the different parties, and to locate each of the existing SIBs within the 
typology defined in objective one.  
4) The final component, to be undertaken in a second phase of the project from 2015, will 
seek to assess whether, and if so why, SIB funding mechanisms enable providers and thus 
 11 
commissioners to achieve better outcomes and at what cost. To address this question, 
we will look for opportunities to compare quantitatively social and health care outcomes 
and costs of interventions funded through SIBs to those of a similar intervention (ideally, 
delivered by the same provider) funded through a traditional funding mechanism (i.e. 
with no social investor and/or no performance-based funding mechanism). Qualitative 
work will also be carried out to understand the reasons for any differences in performance 
(management, process, etc.) by the service provider under the two different funding 
mechanisms. The detail of this phase of the project is heavily dependent on how far the 
SIBs progress during this time. 
 
 
The study began in January 2014 and is currently scheduled to end in December 2015 after 24 
months.  This interim report covers most of components 1 and 2 of the evaluation with the 
exception of comparing SIBs with other forms of payment for health and social care 
(component 1), and estimating the costs of establishing SIBs (component 2).  Chapter 3 
presents the early conceptual framework and literature on SIBs, while chapters 4 and 5 present 
results from documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews focused on how the 
Trailblazers have progressed.   
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2.  Methods 
 
 
Overview 
 
This interim report covers the first 11 months of the evaluation period (January 2014- 
November 2014).  Data collection started in May 2014 due to delays in securing ethical 
approval and local research governance approvals.  The first year of the evaluation has 
comprised the following: 
 
- a literature review of SIBs from publications  in the existing economics, public 
finance and public administration literature and from academic, governmental and 
commercial sectors (Chapter 3); 
- collation of basic information on the SIB Trailblazers from their plans and other 
documents; 
- semi-structured interviews to discuss the development of each trailblazer with: 
o Service providers involved in SIB design and delivery 
o Commissioners in health and social care (CCGs and local authorities) 
o Financial intermediary organisations involved in the development and design 
of SIBs in health and social care and others involved in SIB development (e.g. 
legal specialists) 
o Social investors and 
o National policy advisers (e.g. in the Cabinet Office). 
 
Literature review 
 
The terms “social impact bond” and “social AND impact AND bond” were used to search the 
following electronic databases: CINAHL, Cochrane Library, EMBASE, ERIC, Ethos, Global 
Health, GreenFILE, Health Systems Evidence, HEED, HMIC, IBSS, NBER, NCJRS, NICE evidence 
search, Open Grey, PubMed, Scopus,  Social Policy & Practice, Web of Science, Google 
Scholar. These databases were chosen because they are openly available via the LSHTM 
library service. A criticism of this search approach is that it did not include non-UK terms for 
SIB-like projects – for example – ‘pay-for-success bonds’ or ‘health impact bonds’ which are 
sometimes found in the North American and Australian literature. However, the explicit aim 
of this review is to focus on the empirical and theoretical treatment of ‘Social Impact Bonds’ 
in the academic and non-academic policy literature. There was no time limit placed on the 
search and all languages were included – however, no non-English language papers were 
found. Figure 1 below describes the search process.  
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Figure 2.1: Overview of selection process for review    
 
 
 
 
Interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with service providers, commissioning bodies, 
financial and consulting intermediaries and social investors involved in the development of 
the SIB health and social care Trailblazers.  We conducted 36 interviews between May and 
November 2014 with service providers (n=11), commissioners (n=6), investors (n=2), 
intermediaries (n=11) and others involved in SIBs (n=6), e.g. staff at the Cabinet Office.  We 
undertook interviews in all nine Trailblazers and the Essex SIB.   
 
Initial interviewees were identified through SEIF applications, the Department of Health and 
the Cabinet Office, and subsequent interviewees were identified using the ‘snowball’ 
method. The topic guide for the semi-structured interviews aimed to understand 
informants’ reasons for becoming involved in SIBs and the SIB Trailblazers; the (proposed) 
contractual model in the trailblazer; identification of the target population, outcomes and 
measurement issues; expectations of taking part in a SIB trailblazer; the negotiation process; 
identifying investors; and lessons for future SIBs. 
 
Interviews were transcribed and data were analysed using NVivo 10. Interview data were 
analysed thematically. The research team designed an initial coding framework using 
deductive and inductive logic. First level coding was based on themes from the evaluation’s 
research questions, interview topic guide and the key issues drawn from the literature on 
SIBs and payment for performance. The research team discussed initial themes before 
agreeing main themes and sub-themes for further analysis.  The researchers at RAND and 
LSHTM who had been responsible for field work at different Trailblazers remained in 
frequent contact to reflect upon and refine the coding framework throughout the analytical 
process. 
 
In Chapter 5, we present early findings from the semi-structured interviews by themes.  In 
this Chapter, quotes from interviewees are presented to illustrate a broader theme that 
emerged. In each case the role of the interviewee is presented according to their role 
11,804 •Titles
257
•Abstracts 
read and 
text search
95 •Texts for analysis
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(provider, commissioner, intermediary, investor), but quotes may have been modified to 
preserve the anonymity of the speaker. 
 
Ethical approval 
 
Ethical approval to undertake the study was granted by the research ethics committee of 
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. We obtained local research 
governance permission from the CCG for each Trailblazer, where relevant. 
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3.  Literature review on social impact bonds 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this review is to explore the publicly available empirical and theoretical literature 
relating to SIBs. At present, there is very little empirical data available on the 
implementation and evaluation of SIBs. In contrast to the scarcity of empirical data on SIBs, 
this review highlights the range of more and less theoretically driven sources from academic 
and non-academic authors. The review begins by locating SIBs within the larger literature on 
payment for performance (P4P) before moving into an analysis of the larger literature in 
order to set out the thinking associated with the development of SIBs across different policy 
sectors and countries. It also seeks to examine what the empirical literature suggests about 
what SIBs are in practice, how they function, and what the results of early SIBs show.  
 
SIBs can be considered as a variant of payment for performance, with a focus on outcomes 
based contracting.  At a theoretical level, SIBs are expected to ameliorate many perceived 
shortcomings of previous performance-based contracting programmes, such as the use of 
externally imposed targets, through a focus on locally developed solutions by service 
providers to meet the needs of marginalised populations with entrenched social problems.  
Given the limited empirical evidence on SIBs, it is instructive to look towards the payment 
for performance (P4P) literature, and what is known about P4P in public services, locally-
designed and/or outcomes-based performance payment schemes to understand some 
issues around design and measurement.  Payment for performance (P4P) programmes have 
been introduced widely across high to low-income settings over the past 10 years but there 
remains little convincing evidence that they are a better approach to funding public 
services.   
 
There is limited empirical evidence in favour of introducing P4P schemes that are 
reimbursed entirely on outcomes, which is problematic when extended to SIBs, whose main 
benefits have been their exclusive reimbursement on outcomes.  The majority of the 
evidence finds some positive effect or no evidence of impact following the introduction of a 
P4P scheme.  There is limited evidence on the impact of performance- or outcome-based 
payments on provider behaviour at the organisational level (Shen 2003; Magrath and 
Nichter 2012; Songstad, Lindkvist et al. 2012; Chimhutu, Lindkvist et al. 2014), or negative 
impacts, though most literature suggests that there is some evidence of gaming and adverse 
selection (Van Herck, De Smedt et al. 2010). The development of metrics can also be 
contentious as Petersen et al (2006) suggest that design is important and recommend using 
a mix of absolute and relative incentives for process and outcome measures to 
disincentivise gaming. It is also difficult to demonstrate gaming, this is likely due to limited 
contexts for comparison, with one systematic review recommending that more research is 
needed that seeks to monitor unintended consequences as non-incentivised aspects of 
performance are likely to suffer or fall after the introduction of a P4P programme.  There 
are few studies looking at the economic efficiency of P4P programmes and little evidence on 
cost-effectiveness (Petersen, Woodard et al. 2006; Van Herck, De Smedt et al. 2010; 
Emmert, Eijkenaar et al. 2012).  Just one study was found that aimed to separate the effect 
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of broad health system funding increases from the impact of a new P4P programme 
(Basinga, Gertler et al. 2011). 
 
SIBs are often advocated as a locally-developed solution to entrenched social problems 
however it is notable that there is also conflicting evidence on whether locally designed P4P 
schemes are best.  A study of US hospitals with strong P4P incentives found limited impact, 
and suggested that individually tailored programs may be more effective (Werner, Kolstad 
et al. 2011) while a study on the UK’s CQUIN program found local input was important but 
of limited use at the design stage as outcome setting is a technical process that “involves 
defining indicators, agreeing thresholds, and setting reward levels” which many local 
commissioners were unprepared for (Kristensen, McDonald et al. 2013).   
 
SIBs are expected to bring greater rigour and accountability to performance management, 
especially for service providers and public commissioners.  Similarly, in P4P programmes, 
measurement is repeatedly highlighted as a crucial aspect for the success of a P4P 
programme.  Broadly, there was agreement that there should be information systems to 
facilitate prompt and reliable transfers of performance management systems (Van Herck, 
De Smedt et al. 2010; Werner, Kolstad et al. 2011; Roland and Campbell In press) but there 
often arise issues around constant monitoring and evaluation needs, such as the disruption 
of work and refocusing of staff time on administrative work rather than with service 
recipients (Chimhutu, Lindkvist et al. 2014; Feng, Ma et al. 2014).  There remain issues with 
risk adjustment, for example, it can be statistically confusing and hard to convince providers 
of the credibility of indicators, and requires a large enough sample size to yield sufficient 
reliability (Eijkenaar 2013).   
 
Any application of evidence from P4P should note that the literature offers limited insights 
on best processes for the optimal design of locally-responsive interventions as much of the 
empirical evidence on P4P in health looks at nationwide payment reforms, for example, the 
impact of outcomes-based incentives on the quality of secondary (Petersen, Woodard et al. 
2006; McDonald, Harrison et al. 2007; Powell-Jackson, Yip et al. 2014) and primary care 
(Gravelle, Sutton et al. 2010; Kantarevic and Kralj 2013; Feng, Ma et al. 2014; Roland and 
Campbell In press),  introducing payments for quality improvement in primary care (Doran, 
Fullwood et al. 2006) or nursing homes in the US (Werner, Konetzka et al. 2013)).  
 
Despite the mixed, and often limited, empirical evidence P4P initiatives remain popular 
among policy makers and governments seeking to improve efficiency, effectiveness and 
value for money in health care and social services (Roland 2012; Lagarde, Wright et al. 
2013).  SIBs are appealing as a policy instrument that should ensure that governments only 
pay for successful programming but there remains a dearth of evidence for the assertion 
that SIBs will lead to improved outcomes (Disley, Rubin et al. 2011; McHugh, Sinclair et al. 
2013; Disley, Rubin et al. 2014; Sinclair, McHugh et al. 2014).  
 
Nature of the literature 
 
Of the 95 texts identified for analysis, 61 were classified as ‘non-academic’ and 34 were 
‘academic,’ The ‘non-academic’ reports and policy papers were produced by organisations 
such as charities, consultancies, social investment facilitators, governments and think tanks, 
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which often highlight the potential of SIB development relative to specific interventions. 
This ‘grey’ literature is reviewed alongside work on SIBs produced in academic settings that 
draws on various (frequently conflicting) theoretical approaches to reflect upon the 
applicability of SIBs to policy questions. The academic literature is wider in scope and offers 
a more critical approach to the subject than the grey literature. 
 
The reviewed English language literature was produced between the years 2010 and 2014. It 
discusses the use of SIBs in policy areas as diverse as crime and justice including probation, 
health, education, social care (both of young and older people), social work, local and 
national government, law, management and taxation. The majority of academic sources 
dedicated to SIBs are from, and discuss the applicability of SIB models to, the US. This 
primary US focus is complemented by a secondary interest in English developments, as 
might be expected, given that the first SIB projects were set up in these two countries. The 
majority of non-academic sources identified in the review come from England – followed by 
those from the US, once more reflecting the relatively developed nature of SIBs in these two 
countries compared to others internationally. Given the nascence of the SIBs literature, the 
guiding principles around inclusion and exclusion have erred towards the side of inclusion 
rather than exclusion provided that the papers refer to SIBs at least three times – this was 
judged to be more important than formal peer review for example (as an inclusion criterion 
for ‘academic’ papers), which would have reduced the number of sources for analysis 
substantially. 
 
The non-academic sources published by individual charities, or umbrella groups for 
charitable organisations, emphasise how SIBs may offer strategic opportunities for 
charitable organisations to innovate, collaborate and capitalise upon the changed economic 
and policy context following the banking crisis of 2008 (Fitzpatrick & Thorne, 2011; Griffiths 
& Meinicke, 2014). Documents produced by management consultancies highlight how SIBs 
represent a new market for philanthropic and socially minded investors, and, whilst 
referring to potential pitfalls, are generally positive about the potential for both 
improvements in social outcomes and returns for investors if the new policy arena is 
managed effectively. This is particularly so with reference to specific, measurable 
interventions targeted at difficult to reach populations (Callanan et al, 2012; Martin, 2013). 
There is also a burgeoning literature produced by organisations that act as facilitators, or 
intermediaries in the development of SIB projects. This literature stresses the value of 
partnership working for innovation and the importation of ‘market discipline’ into the public 
sector and among charitable providers (Cohen, 2011). The majority of authors share a keen 
interest in the importance of outcomes’ measurement and effective ways to capture this 
(Social Enterprise UK, 2013). The UK government has further produced a significant 
literature over recent years – in particular from the Cabinet Office - extolling the potential 
virtues of SIBs and emphasising how innovation, transparency, collaboration and prevention 
may be enhanced by SIBs which transfer risk from the public sector to the private sector in 
order to further the goals of ‘social justice’ for ‘vulnerable’ populations (HM Government, 
2011; 2013). The literature produced by various think tanks tends to be more developed in 
theoretical terms, and as with the academic literature, represents a more diverse and 
sometimes critical approach to the development of SIBs (Whitfield, 2012). 
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The majority of academic papers do not provide empirical evidence generated by SIBs. Of 
the purely theoretical papers, many focus upon how SIBs may impact on public policy. Some 
of these papers are supportive of the potential role that SIBs may play in policy 
improvement and particularly in developing better preventive programmes (Bafford, 2014; 
Cox, 2011) whilst others are critical (McHugh et al, 2013; Sinclair et al, 2014). A second 
stream of papers focus on the real or potential impacts of SIBs in the field of probation – 
particularly in the UK (Deering, 2014; Fox and Albertson, 2011; 2012), perhaps reflecting the 
reforms to probation services with the increased use of performance-related contracts and 
the influence of the Peterborough Prison SIB on wider thinking on reducing reoffending. 
There is a third category of papers narrowly focused on the applicability of SIBs to health 
policy and preventive funding centred on the US (Crowley, 2014; Fairfax-Clay, 2013; Trupin, 
2014). These tend to be short, speculative and of limited value. A fourth category, once 
more US-dominated, focuses on banking, finance and tax law, and questions how SIBs might 
require changes to regulatory frameworks to become effective, and how government might 
need to reform the tax system to incentivise increased private investment in potential SIBs. 
There are a small number of papers that engage with both theory and empirics.  These 
endeavour to collect and present qualitative data on SIBs – notably Warner (2012; 2013) 
and Jackson (2013). Finally, Disley et al (2011) and Disley and Rubin (2014) provide strong 
qualitative data on the Peterborough SIB specifically – quantitative analysis of which is 
provided by Jolliffe and Hedderman (2014).  The few available empirical studies will be 
reviewed at the end of this chapter, preceded by a summary of the main themes that 
emerge from the theoretical and discursive literature, with particular emphasis on potential 
areas of tension related to SIBs and public policy.  
 
Themes in the theoretical literature 
 
A number of recurring themes identified in the theoretical sources are discussed in detail 
below. Central to this thematic development is the role of values for those writing about 
SIBs. This permeates the discussions around other key themes which include: the contested 
nature of measurement in SIB development; the management of risk in SIB contracts; and 
how this is closely linked to aligning financial incentives to agreed outcomes. Finally, the 
paradoxical claims made for SIBs as potentially both drivers of innovation and mechanisms 
to scale-up proven interventions, are explored.    
 
The role of values 
 
There is a tension in the theoretical literature focused on SIBs between those authors who 
assert the benefits of introducing market-influenced incentives to tackle ingrained social 
problems and those who emphasise the potential problems with doing so. These different 
perspectives may be understood as expressions of competing values. SIBs may be seen as 
tools to challenge traditional policy failures by proposing new solutions to ingrained social 
problems. Many of these social problems traditionally come under the purview of the public 
sector (e.g. probation services) or charitable provision (e.g. addiction support services) – or 
fall between the two (e.g. loneliness in old age) and thus may have been traditionally under-
funded and perhaps weakly delivered. Another key aspect of SIB delivery for many of its 
champions is to instil private sector management techniques to remedy for the historic 
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shortcomings of public sector and charitable provision. This is linked to a belief in the 
superiority of competitive tendering and value for money auditing systems (Power, 1999). 
Cohen (2011) argues that the advances made in mainstream business in the 1980s and 
1990s by venture capital and entrepreneurship can be replicated through social enterprise 
and impact investment in social services to reform public service provision. Callanan and 
Law (2012) in a report produced by McKinsey & Company emphasise that social innovation 
occurs “at the intersection of the public, private, and social sectors.” For many advocates of 
SIBs, SIBs offer a mechanism to improve the ways in which non-profit organisations collect 
data and measure their performance (Bafford, 2014; Cox, 2011). For these authors, SIBs 
offer an opportunity to challenge cultures of public and third sector underperformance 
through an engagement with, and appropriation of, private sector management practices. 
 
However, a counterview is offered by authors who suggest that there are potential dangers 
in the importation of private sector values and techniques into public policy. This is partly 
ideological, with critics viewing SIBs as an extension of neoliberal logic into government 
policy (Warner, 2012; 2013; Whitfield, 2012; McHugh et al, 2013; Malcolmson, 2014; Sinclair 
et al, 2014). Beyond this broader defence of public values in face of private sector 
encroachment, these authors highlight a number of specific problems associated with the 
extension of private values into public service delivery via SIBs. Warner (2012) emphasises 
the ‘openness’ of public sector contract making and contrasts this with the closed nature of 
private sector contracts that frequently remain hidden from scrutiny due to concerns of 
commercial confidentiality. She suggests that a degree of government, or public sector 
control, or oversight is essential in order to ensure legitimacy in relation to these contracts – 
there is a suspicion that private sector investors or providers may place the profit motive 
above the interest of a target population. Issues of accountability like this are developed 
further by Baliga (2013) who highlights how US prison privatization has been characterized 
by perverse outcomes associated with payment for performance contracting and suggests 
that SIB contracting may offer a solution by harnessing the altruistic nature of charitable 
organisations as a bulwark against corporate abuses. Other authors fear that the 
competitive ethos and performance management regimes imposed on charitable 
organisations by private financiers through SIB models may lead to a diminution of the 
ethical goals of charitable organisations or act as a ‘smokescreen for privatisation’ of service 
provision (McHugh et al, 2013; Whitfield, 2012).  Other concerns raised relate to 
phenomena such as tunnel vision, ‘gaming’ and other perverse behaviour associated with 
targets and payment for performance regimes in general (Bevan and Hood 2006; Roland 
2012). 
 
Measurement 
 
SIBs open up a multitude of questions relating to regimes of measurement. The expressed 
focus on outcomes is emphasised in positive terms across the literature. Perhaps reflecting a 
rejection of the ‘target culture’ which pervaded public service delivery in the Blair and 
Brown governments (Fox and Albertson, 2011), alongside the embrace of the evidence 
based ethos of ‘what matters is what works’ (Deering, 2014), a focus on measured 
outcomes is portrayed as a significant advantage of SIB design (Social Finance, 2011). In 
many ways the focus on outcome measurement may be seen to unite both champions and 
critics of SIBs, and function as its major strength in policy terms, though some authors do 
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caution about the difficulties of accurate measurement in the field of social policy, and the 
need for extensive thought around the most effective ways to do so (Warner, 2012; 2013). 
This insight feeds into broader questions of attribution and the complexity of outcome 
measurement (Sinclair et al, 2014). McHugh et al (2013) posit that welcome as the focus on 
programme outcomes undoubtedly is, there is a danger that SIBs may rely upon an 
oversimplified approach to evaluation. This can misinterpret the contingent factors such as 
the dynamics of the target population, the context in which the intervention takes place and 
changes over time, all of which need to be understood as part of complex social change 
mechanisms affecting outcomes. The need for extensive, ongoing evaluation to ensure that 
SIBs ‘work’ is emphasised by most authors (Cox, 2011; Burand, 2013; Leventhal, 2013; 
Warner, 2012; 2013; Social Finance, 2011). Fox and Albertson (2011) suggest that the 
complexity of SIBs might mean that they remain a niche policy tool – in that the 
demonstrable benefits of SIBs may only accrue if interventions are ‘scaled-up’.  However, 
they suggest that ‘scaling-up’ brings with it challenges which may hinder the effectiveness of 
the original intervention. They also argue in a further paper (Fox and Albertson, 2012) that if 
programmes offer demonstrable benefits, then it may make more sense for commissioners 
to fund them directly without the additional transaction costs linked with SIBs. SIBs may 
therefore represent a pioneering activity that may be followed by more traditional funding 
arrangements, rather than leading to further SIBs. Demel (2013) suggests that 
commissioners ought to think carefully before opting for SIBs as there may be other 
innovative financing models that can achieve results more effectively and efficiently. She 
argues that the increased number of actors involved in SIB delivery will likely increase 
transaction costs, therefore it is important to be clear about what value the added skills, 
expertise and knowledge of the respective actors will bring above and beyond other 
commissioning models. 
 
Risk and financial incentives 
 
A key element in the theory of the SIB mechanism is the transfer of risk from the state to 
private investors and sometimes also to providers (Mulgan et al, 2011). This is attractive to 
governments and commissioners for a number of reasons. Many sources (both grey and 
academic) highlight the changed economic circumstances following the banking crash of 
2008 (Early Intervention Foundation, 2014; Dodd and Moody, 2011; Jackson, 2013) and the 
space this apparently opens up for innovative forms of financing of social interventions 
(Young Foundation and NESTA, 2011; HM Government, 2013). It is interesting to note that 
many authors link the relevance of SIBs with the context of austerity without necessarily 
making the link between austerity and the possibility of greater cautiousness on the part of 
potential investors – nor of commissioners in how they use their limited funds.  
 
In an English policy making context, SIBs also offer charitable organisations a chance to 
capitalise on a new set of opportunities following the election of the coalition government 
and the Prime Minister’s advocacy of the Big Society. This aligns with the Government’s 
assertion that ‘social investment can deliver social justice objectives’ (HM Government, 
2013). SIBs may impact upon charitable organisations in a number of ways. Firstly, it is 
argued that, because SIBs can encourage a diverse range of service providers to deliver 
public services, they allow charities (both large and small) the potential to become more 
deeply involved in service provision, and secondly, it is argued that, as the contracts are 
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frequently granted for more than one year, this allows stability for charities to build up their 
capacity in service provision, rather than having to pursue a series of short term contracts to 
survive (Social Enterprise UK, 2013). 
 
For some writers, the ability of SIBs to transfer risk opens up a policy space for innovative 
practice which SIBs may be well placed to exploit (Fox and Albertson, 2011; Jackson, 2013; 
Leventhal, 2013), whilst others take a very different view and emphasise that SIBs may be 
best used to capitalise on proven interventions and the ‘scaling-up’ of these (Trupin, 2014; 
Crowley, 2014; Burand, 2013). ‘Scaling-up’ is seen as problematic, however, by Jackson 
(2013) who suggests that the contextual factors which may be important in proving the 
value of a concept in one area may be different elsewhere, thus hindering simple 
replication. There is no consensus in the literature on whether SIBs are best suited to 
innovation or ‘scaling-up’ – rather, different authors draw on competing logics to make 
contradictory claims. A distinction between the English and US approaches appears to be 
that American proponents of SIBs in the literature emphasise the potential for ‘scaling up’ 
projects, whilst in England, SIBs proponents more readily highlight the innovative nature of 
programmes (Goodall, 2014).  This distinction may have significant implications for an 
understanding of how risk and financial incentives are developed in the two countries. 
Nevertheless it is certainly the case that the SIBs so far developed in the US tend to be 
small-scale pilots despite the rhetoric of some American proponents of SIBs  
 
Whilst, as highlighted above, government agencies and SIB proponents such as Social 
Finance and the Young Foundation in the UK emphasise the transfer of risks from the state 
to private investors, a number of authors (particularly in the US) focus on questions around 
how the risk to investors can be made sufficiently attractive to incentivise them to invest in 
the nascent market. Bafford (2013) argues that the risks for investors need to be minimised 
in order to encourage their involvement. Cox (2013) calls for the tax system to reward the 
SIB investors more effectively. Burand (2013) likewise calls for action to realign the 
relationship between debt and equity for SIB investors, as does Leventhal (2013) who also 
emphasises the need for a dedicated intermediary partner to help minimise investor risk. 
Dagher (2013) explores the potential legal and tax implications for non-profit organisations 
of being involved in SIBs. Pauly and Swanson (2013) suggest that the value of SIBs and its 
calculation of risk are likely to be heavily contextually-specific. Shiller (2013) makes the case 
that to be more attractive to investors, investors should be able to ‘short’ the bond – 
however, this kind of secondary marketization of SIBs is cited as a potential danger 
elsewhere on the grounds that it increases complexity and risk in an already complex and 
risky activity (Warner, 2012). This focus on taxation policy and regulation appears to be of 
greater concern to American authors than their UK counterparts, though there are areas of 
shared interest. 
 
Having discussed some of the key thematic elements emanating from the theoretically 
focused SIBs literature, the next section examines empirical studies of SIBs. 
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Empirical studies 
 
It is important to place the health and social care Trailblazers within the wider context of 
operational SIBs. Whilst much has been written about the potential of SIBs in both the grey 
literature as well as increasingly by academic researchers, the existent SIB projects 
themselves are still at an early stage. Table 3.1, below, details the fourteen SIBs currently up 
and running in the UK. The majority of these projects focus on tackling issues of youth 
unemployment and are linked to the Department of Work and Pensions. The second main 
area of focus relates to programmes that ‘strengthen families,’ including two of the 
Trailblazer projects (Essex and Manchester). There is also the Peterborough SIB to tackle 
recidivism and another trailblazer aimed at reducing rough-sleeping.  
 
Table 3.1: SIB projects in the UK 
 
SIB Social Issue Location Status 
Links4Life Increasing education, employment and training 
for young people 
London Operational 
Triodos New Horizons Increasing education, employment and training 
for young people 
Merseyside Operational 
Advance Increasing education, employment and training 
for young people 
Birmingham Operational 
Living Balance Increasing education, employment and training 
for young people 
Perth Operational 
Employer Hub & 
Nottingham Futures 
Increasing education, employment and training 
for young people 
Nottingham Operational 
3SC Capitalise Increasing education, employment and training 
for young people 
Cardiff & Newport Operational 
Energise Innovation Increasing education, employment and training 
for young people 
Thames Valley Operational 
Teens & Toddlers 
Innovation 
Increasing education, employment and training 
for young people 
Greater 
Manchester 
Operational 
Prevista Increasing education, employment and training 
for young people 
London Operational 
Multi-Systemic Therapy 
(MST) 
Strengthening Families Essex Operational 
It’s All About Me (IAAM) 
Adoption 
Strengthening Families National Operational 
Multi-Dimensional 
Treatment Foster Care – 
Adolescents (MTFC-A) 
Strengthening Families Manchester Operational 
Team Parenting Strengthening Families Birmingham Unclear 
One Service Tackling Recidivism Peterborough Operational 
Rough Sleepers Reducing Homelessness London Operational 
Source: Goodall, 2014; Cabinet Office http://data.gov.uk/sib_knowledge_box/map 
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Outside the UK, there are a number of other operational SIB projects. Firstly, in the area of 
education and training for young people, there is the Utah High Quality Pre-school 
Programme in the USA, Buzinezzclub Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Duo for a Job in 
Brussels, Belgium, and Juvat based in Augsburg, Germany. In the ‘strengthening families’ 
category, there is the Sweet Dreams project in Saskatchewan, Canada, and two Australian 
projects based in New South Wales – the New Parent and Infant Network and the 
Benevolent Society Social Benefit Bond. Finally, there are three US projects focused on 
tackling recidivism: the Adolescent Behavioural Learning Experience and Increasing 
Employment and Improving Public Safety, both in New York City, and, in Massachusetts, 
there is the Juvenile Justice Pay for Success Initiative. On top of these, there are reportedly 
over 100 more SIBs in development (Goodall, 2014). 
 
Despite the rise of SIB projects both in the UK and abroad, so far there is little empirical 
research published detailing the operation of the UK SIBs   The lack of data is partly due to 
the small number of operational SIBs and the normal time-lag required to evaluate such 
socially complex projects – it may take a number of years to be able to collect the data to 
show whether a project has been successful given the long-term nature of many of these 
interventions. A small number of authors have begun to report empirically on SIB 
development, however. For example, though not a study of the functioning of any actual 
projects, Jackson (2013) draws on empirical qualitative data from over 100 interviews with 
international community development specialists and impact investors and suggests that 
there are important issues that need to be better understood with relation to SIBs – 
particularly related to measurement practices. Firstly, he suggests the current focus is on SIB 
design – with much less attention on ‘down-stream’ issues of attribution and measurement 
complexity. However, this will become ever more important as SIBs mature. Secondly, the 
effects of SIBs tend to be measured at the population level, but this fails to shed much light 
on the changes that occur at the individual, or household level – more research is needed 
here in order to increase understanding of how SIBs may (or may not) improve both overall 
and individual outcomes. 
 
Warner (2013) interviewed architects of the (operational) Rikers Island recidivism SIB and 
the Alexandra City pre-school SIB aimed at increasing pre-school place uptake (in 
development) in Virginia USA, alongside documentary analysis of these two projects and 
that of the Peterborough SIB. She focused her analysis on the actors involved in SIB 
development and noted how SIBs increase the numbers of these and the complexity of the 
relationships between these actors – requiring intermediaries to manage the contracts for 
services once let. She also highlights the importance of philanthropic investment, albeit 
from a very large charitable foundation, despite the focus on attracting private investors 
highlighted elsewhere. She notes the innovative nature of the SIB model and its relation to 
outcome payments, highlighting the importance of the proven nature of the three 
respective interventions. She concludes:  
 
“What is clear from this analysis is the governance processes in design and 
implementation are critical. SIBs are very complex. Goal alignment, network 
management, evaluation design to ensure core outcomes are measured, and risk 
management for investors, government, and clients are challenges that raise the 
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transactions costs of SIB schemes. SIBs are being promoted for two primary reasons: 
to bring rigor to social service interventions and to attract private finance to areas 
where public investment is lacking. While such evaluation rigor is critical for 
structuring the private investment scheme, it may undermine developmental 
evaluation approaches which encourage critical reflection and ongoing program 
innovation” (Warner, 2013) 
 
 
The most extensive empirical analyses of an operational SIB are provided by Disley et al 
(2011) and Disley and Rubin (2014) who focus on the early implementation and mid-phase 
experience of the Peterborough SIB in two RAND reports for the Ministry of Justice in 
England. The first of these draws upon 22 qualitative interviews with actors involved in 
setting up the SIB and offers a number of important findings. These include the need for 
good coordination and oversight from Government Departments to establish the initial SIB, 
and the importance of intermediary expertise to manage contracts and financial aspects as 
well as ‘softer’ relational skills to keep all actors engaged. The social motivation of investors 
is also cited as significant – the Peterborough project was not about fast returns for 
investors, but engaged socially motivated investors with an interest in more than a financial 
return. They note that tax rules may have acted as a barrier to investment in this case 
(Disley et al, 2011).  
 
The second report, three years later, once more uses qualitative methods including 39 
interviews to reflect upon the design, implementation and operation of the Peterborough 
SIB.   Again, the authors offer a number of learning points including the freedom that 
providers have to innovate and be flexible around delivering aspects of the service to 
offenders. They find that small-scale providers felt liberated by not chasing short-term 
contracts and were therefore better able to focus on the quality of service delivery. 
Improved data collection and sharing were seen in positive terms – in the future it would be 
advisable to account for this in contracts – as there had been some confusion early on as to 
who was responsible for collecting and analysing specific pieces of data (Disley and Rubin, 
2014).   
 
Jolliffe and Hederman (2014) used propensity score matching to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the Peterborough SIB as part of the quantitative evaluation of the programme for the 
Ministry of Justice. The study matched 936 offenders released from Peterborough with 
9,360 released from other prisons on 36 out of 38 variables. This was complicated by 
difficulties in accessing the requisite data – they note that it took ‘11 months to agree the 
sample and obtain all the data needed to begin analysis’ (Jolliffe and Hedderman, 2014). 
This was linked to problems of data quality, including missing data on the type of offence in 
the routine systems. Social Finance and the Ministry of Justice had different views about 
who had (and should have) been helped in the Peterborough SIB, which had implications for 
who was included in the Peterborough sample and also implications for the control group. 
The first cohort analysis showed an 8.39% reduction in reoffending rates compared to the 
control group. This was insufficient to trigger payment (the goal being 10%), but the project 
was on target for the three-year goal of a 7.5% reduction in reoffending when it was ceased 
earlier this year due to wider Government policy changes (Ministry of Justice, 2014). 
Peterborough remains the most researched and best understood SIB, however there is no 
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published evidence relating the costs of setting up and running the SIB with the costs in a 
control group, so there is still no cost-effectiveness evidence on SIBs compared with other 
methods of paying for public services.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This review has thematically analysed the growing theoretically-focused SIB literature 
produced mainly in the US and the UK over the past four years emanating from both 
academic and non-academic sources. Key themes include the competing rationales of public 
and private values in policy making, new approaches to measuring performance and 
outcomes in particular, and considerations of risk and financial incentives. The review also 
showed the comparably small number of empirical studies of SIBs. The empirical studies 
highlight the high transaction costs of SIBs, the complexity of data monitoring and 
measurement as well as the ability for SIB delivery to offer space for innovation to service 
providers and improved outcomes as exemplified by the first outcome findings from the 
Peterborough SIB.  
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4.  Overview of SIB Trailblazers 
 
 
 
This chapter describes the main characteristics of the Trailblazers and provides an overview of 
development in each site (more details are given in the Appendix). The chapter is based on fieldwork 
conducted between May 2014 and November 2014. A finding of the early fieldwork is the range of 
variation in progress made by, and design of, projects since receiving initial SEIF funding. Projects 
(except Essex) received their initial SEIF grants between December 2012 and March 2013.   
 
All efforts have been made to verify the information in this chapter as accurate as of December 
2014. Information reported here has been found in official documentation or reported by 
interviewees. It is recognized that many of these initiatives have since changed in scope or structure, 
and updated information on each initiative will be made available in the final report. Please also 
note that certain relevant information relating to these SIB initiatives cannot be reported here 
where such information is not yet in the public domain.  
 
Two Trailblazers and Essex have signed contracts and commenced operation while the majority have 
made progress in service design and discussions on the SIB, but remain at the SIB negotiation phase 
between commissioners, intermediaries, providers and funders. Two others will not become SIBs. 
 
Table 4.1 below provides a summary of the nine Trailblazers plus Essex. 
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Table 4.1: Summary profile of health and social care SIB Trailblazers as of December 2014 
 
Project Provider Commissioner Location Interventions/objectives Outcome metrics SIB already 
in place 
Evaluator 
Sandwell Marie Curie Cancer 
Care1 
Sandwell and 
West Birmingham 
CCG  
Birmingham Integrated end-of-life care services Increase in proportion of patients dying in their usual 
place of residence; decrease in unplanned emergency 
admission rate in final month of life 
In tender 
process 
Not yet 
determined 
Cornwall Age UK1 Cornwall County 
Council 
Cornwall Early interventions for a cohort of 1000 frail older 
people with LTCs at risk of emergency admission. 
 
Reduced A&E admissions, improved well-being 
(Edinburgh and Warwick mental well-being scale) 
No Not yet 
determined 
East 
Lancashire 
Green Dreams  NHS East 
Lancashire CCG 
East Lancashire Provision of patient-specific tailored health and social 
care interventions to reduce isolation, unemployment 
and poor quality of life  
This project is currently still funded by East Lancashire 
CCG, yet PbR options are being considered. Outcomes 
likely include reducing isolation and returning to work 
or education 
No n/a 
Essex  Action for Children  Essex County 
Council 
Essex  Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST), which delivers family 
therapy in the home through highly qualified therapists 
delivered to 380 children on the edge of care or 
custody 
Days saved in care as the primary outcome metric. 
Other outcome metrics include improved school 
attendance, decreased offending and improved 
emotional wellbeing 
Yes OPM 
Leeds Deep Green Leeds CCGs (3) Leeds Setting up a 75-bed nursing facility and creating a 
community of care delivering nursing care to a mix of 
high-needs people. 
Not specified in details in the presentation – 
“complex metrics” used, many outcomes, incl. money 
saved for the government by the interventions. 
No n/a 
Manchester  Action for Children Manchester City 
Council 
Manchester Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care for 
Adolescents programme (MTFC-A) providing 
behavioural interventions for 95 children aged 11 to 14 
years  
Number of children moved from residential care to 
foster placements. ‘Bonus’ outcome metrics: 
improved school attendance, better behaviour and 
wider wellbeing. 
Yes Implementat
ion has been 
evaluated, 
SIB will be 
evaluated 
internally 
Newcastle Changing Lives, First Contact 
Clinical, HealthWORKS 
Newcastle and Mental 
Health Concern 
NHS Newcastle 
West CCG 
Newcastle West Improve the self-management of long-term conditions 
through social prescribing (i.e. non-medical 
interventions in the local community to foster 
sustained healthy behaviours)  
Achieved Improvement of the outcomes on the 
Wellbeing Star and savings for secondary care acute 
usage  
No (expected to 
start in April 
2015) 
In 
consideratio
n 
Shared Lives  Identified STC (for 
Manchester; to be 
determined for 
Lambeth) 
Manchester City 
Council (Lambeth 
Council for 
Lambeth) 
Manchester 
(Lambeth to 
follow) 
An alternative to care homes for people in need of 
support: carers share their lives and often their homes 
with those they support 
Number of new Shared Lives care placements 
established 
No (Manchester 
expected April 
2015; Lambeth 
expected for 
summer 2015) 
Not yet 
determined 
Thames 
Reach 
Thames Reach Housing 
Association 
Greater London 
Authority 
London Personalised service pathway for a cohort of 415 
entrenched rough sleepers. 
Reduction in rough sleeping, move to stable 
accommodation, sustained reconnection, reduced 
A&E admissions, progress to employment, education 
or volunteering. 
Yes  
(Nov. 2012- Nov 
2015) 
DCLG 
Worcester Age UK Herefordshire 
and Worcestershire 
Worcester county 
council, Worcester 
CCGs (3) 
Worcestershire Early intervention and self-care programmes for 
isolated individuals.  
Reduction in self-reported loneliness (using UCLA-9 
scale) 
Bid under review 
by commissioner 
Written into 
tender 
1 Defined as lead provider or commissioner according to SEIF documents. Subject to change pending results of competitive tender.
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Sandwell 
 
The Sandwell SIB seeks to improve outcomes for End of Life Care (EOLC) patients living in 
Sandwell and West Birmingham through a redesigned integrated patient pathway that 
delivers care through a coordination hub designed to improve communication between 
service providers, patients and carers.  This SIB will use two metrics to measure outcomes 
and determine outcome payments: an increase in the proportion of service users who die in 
their usual place of residence, and a reduction in the rate of emergency admissions in the 
final month of life. Alongside the SIB funded element, the EOLC service redesign also 
incorporates non-SIB funded services such as palliative care, hospice care, support services 
and specialised nursing, to be commissioned through a national tender process and block 
contract.  
 
The Sandwell and West Birmingham Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) serves a 
population with high levels of deprivation. In 2012, a CCG-initiated project identified EOLC 
redesign as a CCG priority given high levels of fragmentation in service delivery. At the same 
time, the NHS Confederation and public sector legal specialist firm Bevan Brittan LLP were in 
separate and unrelated discussions to develop a health and social care SIB which led to 
negotiations with Marie Curie Cancer Care (MCCC) and Social Finance, and a successful 
application for Social Enterprise Investment Funds (SEIF) to support the development of an 
EOLC programme based on a SIB. Staff at the Sandwell and West Birmingham CCG saw 
potential for alignment between the CCG’s needs and the SEIF proposal. In 2013, the CCG 
and the other project consortium members, including MCCC, NHS Confederation, NHS 
Clinical Commissioners, Bevan Brittan LLP and Social Finance started work to review the 
service design of EOLC in Sandwell and West Birmingham. 
 
From July 2013 to May 2014 the CCG, Marie Curie, Bevan Brittan LLP and Social Finance 
worked collaboratively to engage stakeholders through a series of public events. The project 
team reviewed the relevant literature and developed potential care models and funding 
arrangements for a new EOLC service in Sandwell and West Birmingham. Once the new 
service model was agreed, Social Finance and Marie Curie withdrew from the collaboration 
in order to work on a joint bid to provide the SIB-based service once it was put out to 
tender. A decision on the chosen provider to deliver services funded through the SIB is 
expected in February 2015. Until then, it is unclear who the likely investors will be, how the 
SIB will be designed (i.e. with/without an SPV, although the project proposal favours an SPV) 
and what the agreed investor rates of return might be. It is expected that the rate of return 
will be no higher than 5% following CCG and local authority Joint Health and Overview 
Scrutiny Committee concerns about potential negative public perceptions of services being 
funded to generate private profit in this area (Sandwell and West Birmingham CCG, 2014) . 
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Table 4.2: Main characteristics of the Sandwell SIB 
 
Timeframe 
(expected) Start date 01/09/2015 
(expected) End date 31/08/2018 
Parties involved 
Service provider Numerous bids including MCCC, local NHS and non-NHS providers 
Commissioner Sandwell & West Birmingham CCG 
Intermediary Social Finance (with MCCC); Bevan Brittan LLP (with CCG) 
Investors This will depend upon who wins contract, but investors approached already 
include Bridges, Big Society Capital, LGT Venture Philanthropy, Barrow 
Cadbury, NESTA 
Focus of the SIB 
Type of target population Patients requiring EOLC 
Size of target population 1000 EOLC patients per year  
Problem tackled by the SIB Lack of an integrated EOLC care pathway leading to poor communication 
between service providers, patients and carers. In turn, this has been shown 
to lead to unplanned emergency admissions for patients in the last month 
of life and increased numbers of deaths in hospital when patients had 
preferred to die at home 
Type of services proposed 1. A coordination hub which coordinates packages of EOLC across all 
local providers 
2. A rapid response service on duty 24/7 to help people in the 
community 
Geographic remit West Birmingham and Sandwell 
Outcome-based component of the SIB 
Outcome metrics The precise outcome targets and payment level will be set through the 
commissioning and procurement process. The metrics proposed are: 
1. Increase in the proportion of service users who die in their usual place 
of residence across a service user cohort of 1000 patients per year. 
2. Reduction of emergency admissions in the last month of life against an 
agreed baseline of 710 patients per year. 
Type of target  1. An increase in the number of people dying in usual place of residence 
from 320 to 625. This represents a 30.5 percentage point increase 
across the service user cohort of 1000.   
2. A reduction in the number of non-elective emergency admissions 
from 710 to 473. This represents 33% fewer emergency admissions 
against the agreed baseline of 710.  
Data collection to measure outcomes  The precise data collection and outcome measurement processes are yet to 
be clarified. However it is assumed that data on A&E admissions will be 
drawn from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) data.   
Is the provider payment based on outcomes? 1. £465 per death in usual place of residence (Big Lottery/Cabinet Office 
would pay c.30% of total outcomes payments) 
2. £2,560 per avoided emergency admission. This is 95% of the cost of an 
average non-elective emergency admission for this cohort 
Contractual relationships (specify actual or proposed) 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and investors? 
Not yet identified 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and service providers? 
Not yet identified 
Is there a contract between investors and 
service providers? 
Not yet identified 
Is there an SPV? Yes, proposed 
Investment 
Investors already on board Not yet identified 
Size of each contribution Not yet identified 
Sources: This table is based on fieldwork sources and Sandwell & West Birmingham CCG and Marie Curie 
Cancer Care (April, 2014) Social investment in end of life care initiative: Stage 3 report 
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Figure 4.1, Proposed SIB model, Sandwell 
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Cornwall   
 
The proposed SIB is to be used to reduce dependence on public sector health and social care 
services by engaging voluntary sector organisations (VSOs) to deliver personalised care 
packages for patients with high service use and multiple long-term conditions. This is a 
collaborative service model developed between voluntary sector organisations and local 
commissioners in health and social care, initiated by Age UK Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, 
in 2010. The project aims to develop a proof of concept model of integrated health and 
social care services that improves patient outcomes and produces measurable cost savings, 
specifically in secondary acute care.  
 
There have been two pilot projects, in Newquay, and Penwith, Cornwall, to test the service 
model. Both were accompanied by an independent evaluation by the Nuffield Trust. In 
Newquay and Penwith, the target populations (n=50 and n=1000, respectively) were 
identified using a risk stratification model to identify patients with high use or at high risk of 
readmission to hospital. The target population then received personalised service packages 
to enable better self-management of chronic conditions and less reliance on formal 
caregivers, including district nursing services. These pilots were funded with bridge funding 
from Age UK’s national office, various philanthropic grants, and a local endowment. Social 
Finance has held an advisory role at intermittent points in the process, primarily around the 
identification of measurable outcomes that could appeal to external investors, if and when a 
SIB model is used. The Penwith pilot has ten main outcome measures; of these, it is likely 
that any future SIB’s payable outcomes will be a reduction in avoidable admissions to A&E, 
and an improvement in self-reported well-being based on the Edinburgh and Warwick 
mental well-being scale (Tennant et al 2007). 
 
The Trailblazer team recently received a grant from the Cabinet Office’s Social Action Team 
to pilot this service at a new site in the East of Cornwall. It is undecided how this project will 
be funded, and negotiations are currently underway to discuss whether this will become a 
SIB contract or whether alternate sources of bridge funding will be procured (as with 
Newquay and Penwith). In Cornwall, the lead service provider, Age UK and its national office 
remain supportive of SIBs as a funding mechanism.  If Cornwall’s proof of concept is 
established, it could be a basis for Age UK to gain long-term funding for preventive services 
using the SIB model in other CCGs around the country.  
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Table 4.3: Main characteristics of proposed Cornwall SIB 
 
Timeframe 
(expected) Start date To be determined 
(expected) End date To be determined 
Parties involved 
Service provider Age UK Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly in partnership with other local VCS 
organisations in Cornwall 
Commissioner 
NHS Kernow 
Intermediary Support from Social Finance on model development, limited to 
advisory/consultancy role 
Investors 
To be identified 
 
 
Focus of the SIB 
Type of target population Older individuals with multiple long term conditions, high service users, low 
mobility, high risk of avoidable admission to A&E. 
Size of target population 1000 patients 
Problem tackled by the SIB Reduce dependency on statutory health and social care, especially acute 
hospital services, through increased use of voluntary sector services to 
reduce costs. 
Type of services proposed Introducing personalisation in health and social care through greater 
engagement with the voluntary sector 
Geographic remit Pilot project with 1000 people in Penwith, West Cornwall. Forthcoming 
project with 1000+ people in East Cornwall. 
Outcome-based component of the SIB 
Outcome metrics Reduced avoidable admissions to A&E; improved well-being, measured with 
the Edinburgh and Warwick mental well-being scale (7 attributes, 5 point 
scale). 
Type of target  To be defined based on Penwith project data, available in late 2014 
Data collection to measure outcomes  Data on A&E admissions will be drawn from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) 
data.  Well-being data will be drawn from questionnaires, likely 
administered by service providers. 
Is the provider payment based on outcomes? To be determined  
Contractual relationships (specify actual or proposed) 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and investors? 
No 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and service providers? 
No 
Is there a contract between investors and 
service providers? 
No 
Is there an SPV? Yes, proposed.  
Investment 
Investors already on board Informal discussions held 
Size of each contribution N/A 
Sources: this table is based on fieldwork information. 
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Figure 4.2, Proposed SIB model, Cornwall 
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East Lancashire  
 
The Green Dreams Project was initiated in Padiham in 2010 and as of February 2015 
operates across thirteen GP surgeries in East Lancashire without a SIB funding mechanism 
(Green Dreams Project n.d.; Green Dreams Project CIC, 2013). It currently serves half of the 
adult patient population (approximately 130,000 registered patients) in East Lancashire and 
receives around seventy referrals from GPs each month. 
 
The Green Dreams Project provides local, community-based solutions in East Lancashire to 
unemployment, isolation and reduced quality of life. As such, it aims to reduce isolation and 
to increase (returning to) education and work. This is achieved by linking Green Dreams 
project managers with individual GP practices who provide one to one support to patients. 
The project managers provide a ‘triad of care’ in which they 1) provide tailored coordinated 
care; 2) combine health with social care needs; and 3) create opportunities for patients to 
get involved in community activities (Green Dreams Project CIC, 2013). The intervention is 
aimed at individuals over 18 years of age with “knock on effects for their children and other 
dependents and family members” (College of Medicine n.d.).  
 
In 2010, original grant funding was received from Innovate Now North West, which was 
used to pay the first project worker for the first year. In 2011, the Green Dreams Project 
collaborated with the Lancashire Care NHS Foundation Trust (LCFT), which seconded four 
people to Green Dreams to become project managers. Since 2011, Green Dreams has been 
funded by NHS East Lancashire CCG. Other funding for specific projects includes the Social 
Value Fund and the Prince’s Charities (SEIF PbR Application, 2013, internal document). 
 
In 2013, the commissioner, NHS East Lancashire CCG, recognised that not all patient 
outcomes were health outcomes and thus other departments could be funding the project 
as well. As such, the Department of Health asked the Green Dreams Project to look for 
payment by results opportunities. With SEIF funding, Local Partnerships and other partners 
stepped in to narrow down Green Dreams’ outcomes, to create a robust way of measuring 
outcomes and to look at SIB and PbR mechanisms as options for future funding. They 
presented their findings and alternate options for funding models (SIB and PbR) to the Local 
Commissioner in October 2013. It was agreed that key outcomes included reducing isolation 
and returning to work or education. Furthermore, a subset of outcomes included, amongst 
others, changes in housing, debt and benefits. In addition, medical and physical outcomes 
were also taken into account, such as mental health and healthy eating respectively. 
Following these discussions, an online monitoring system was developed in which 72 
outcomes for each patient could be measured. The monitoring system has been in place 
since August 2014. 
 
During the presentation in October 2013, Green Dreams advocated for a ‘hybrid’ PbR 
model, which could possibly be funded by a SIB mechanism, where one commissioner would 
commit 80% of the necessary funding (a ‘block contract’) while the other 20% would be set 
up as a PbR model (which could be funded up front by a private or social investor) (Green 
Dreams Project CIC, 2013). If the outcomes would be achieved, the same or other 
commissioners would pay the remaining 20% back to the investor, including a return. 
Following this presentation the commissioner committed to funding the Green Dreams 
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Project for one more year, with the caveat that they did want to consider the hybrid model 
in the future. As of March 2015, the Green Dreams Project is still commissioned and funded 
by East Lancashire CCG, and is therefore not currently funded through a SIB or PbR 
mechanism. However, the project is still considering PbR options for future funding while 
the commissioner has agreed to continue funding until other funding is secured. 
 
Note:  There is no table summarising this trailblazer because The Green Dreams Project had 
not yet developed a SIB or related payment for outcomes model when data collection 
ended. Instead, Local Partnerships did develop a potential payment for outcomes approach, 
and the diagram below is adapted from this approach. Since a respondent indicated that a 
non-SIB PbR mechanism is the most likely option to be taken forward at some point, this 
PbR model is presented in the diagram instead of a SIB. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Hypothetical PbR model1 
  
                                                     
1 The research team developed this diagram in collaboration with respondents involved in the development of 
the PbR model 
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Essex 
 
In 2010, Social Finance began working with Essex County Council (among other local 
authorities) to gauge their interest in developing a SIB for use in children’s services. As a 
result, Social Finance conducted feasibility work with Essex County Council, after which it 
was decided that Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST) would be funded through a SIB mechanism. 
Subsequently, a competitive procurement process took place after which Social Finance was 
awarded a contract by Essex County Council to develop and implement the SIB (Essex 
County Council and Social Finance 2012). Over the following year, the SIB mechanism was 
developed through dialogue and co-production between Essex County Council, Social 
Finance and other parties. This was coordinated by a project board and included seeking 
legal advice about the provision of services under a SIB model.  
 
In November 2012, Essex County Council became the first local authority to commission and 
to award a SIB for the provision of an MST service aimed at children in or at-risk of going 
into care (Griffiths and Meinicke 2014). MST has been provided in the UK for several years 
without SIB financing.  It provides family support through therapeutic assistance in order to 
rebuild relationships as well as through practical assistance (Barclay & Symons, 2013b). The 
Essex SIB went live in April 2013 and will be operational for five years, with outcome-related 
payments made over eight years (Cabinet Office 2013; Essex County Council & Social 
Finance [no date]). After a procurement process as led by Social Finance, Action for Children 
was commissioned to provide MST services, with an ‘Evolution Fund’ running alongside the 
MST funding. This Evolution Fund was created to provide flexible funding for the MST 
programme (Cabinet Office 2013). As such, it acts as a reserve fund that holds money not 
originally allocated at the start of the SIB and is intended as a discretionary budget to 
reinforce achievement of positive outcomes across the tracking period. An SPV, Children’s 
Support Services Ltd, was established to manage the SIB, the contracts with the investors 
(subscription and loan agreements), the service provider (service contracts), and the 
commissioner (outcomes contract) (Cabinet Office 2013; Barclay & Symons 2013b). A total 
of £3.1m of investment was secured from investors including Big Society Capital and Bridges 
Ventures. The evolution Fund is also part of the investment and was provided by the 
investors. The base case returns to investors are expected to be eight to twelve per cent 
derived from outcome payments based on the average number of days in care saved. Essex 
County Council pays for these outcomes up to a cap of £7m (Cabinet Office 2013). For each 
individual, during a period of 30 months from commencement of the MST (excluding MST 
Therapy days), the number of days spent in care are measured. On a quarterly basis, 
payments are made to the investors based on the average number of days spent in care 
across the cohort compared to a historic benchmark comparison group. 
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Table 4.4: Main characteristics of the Essex SIB 
 
Timeframe 
Start date April 2013 
End date Operational for five years, with payments made across eight years 
Parties involved 
Service provider Action for Children 
Commissioner Essex County Council 
Intermediary Social Finance  
Investors Big Society Capital, Bridges Ventures, Barrow Cadbury Trust, the Tudor 
Trust, Esmée Fairbairn Foundation, King Baudouin Foundation, Charities Aid 
Foundation and Social Venture Fund.  
SPV Children’s Support Services Ltd 
Independent evaluator OPM 
Focus of the SIB 
Type of target population 11-16 year olds at the edge of care/custody 
Size of target population 380 young people over a five-year timespan (thereby diverting around 100 
children from care) 
Problem tackled by the SIB There was a gap in addressing the specific needs of adolescents at the edge 
of care through service provision. Essex experienced an increase in numbers 
of looked after children, costing £65m annually 
Type of services proposed Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST) 
Geographic remit Essex 
Outcome-based component of the SIB 
Outcome metrics - Primary outcome metric: savings of days in care 
- Other metrics: school attendance, emotional wellbeing and reduced 
reoffending 
Type of target  Average number of days spent in care 
Data collection to measure outcomes  At the end of each measurement quarter, the average number of days spent 
in care is compared with historical case file data. This historical data is 
collected prior to the SIB, covering 650 cases tracked over 30 months.  
Is the provider payment based on outcomes? Yes. A maximum of £7m in outcome payments over the contract term.  
Contractual relationships (specify actual or proposed) 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and investors? 
No. The commissioner and the SPV have an outcomes-based contract. 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and service providers? 
No. There are service contracts between the SPV and the provider. 
Is there a contract between investors and 
service providers? 
No. The investors fund the SPV and have agreements with the SPV. 
Is there an SPV? Children’s Support Services Ltd 
Investment 
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Investors already on board Yes  
Size of each contribution In total, there is £3.1m of secured funding, including:  
- £825,000 from Big Society Capital  
- £825,000 from Bridges Ventures 
Sources: this table is based on fieldwork information as well as the following references: Cabinet Office 2013; 
Barclay & Symons 2013a; Barclay & Symons 2013b; Big Society Capital 2013; Bridges Ventures 2013; Essex 
County Council & Social Finance [no date]; Social Finance [no date b]. 
 
Figure 4.4, SIB model, Essex 
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Leeds 
 
The Leeds SIB trailblazer was developed by Deep Green Care Community Interest Company 
(CIC) and aimed to deliver active case management for a cohort of 70-100 patients between 
the ages of 18-64 with very complex needs due to physical health conditions. The proof of 
concept proposition intended to use an existing nursing facility with between 20-35 beds 
alongside a mobile community nurse specialist team to deliver an integrated care service for 
patients which would allow admissions to the facility for intermediate care, avoidance of 
admissions to hospitals and improved outcomes for patients living at home as well as those 
who become unable to live at home as an alternative to standard residential homes. It was 
premised upon the development of an outcomes based arrangement with local 
commissioners in the Leeds and West Yorkshire area drawing on a SIB investment 
instrument to raise working capital for the service and link improved health outcomes to 
financial success (Halfpenny and Hotchkiss, 2014 p3). 
 
This was a purely provider instigated and led initiative that received SEIF funding in May 
2013. There was no commissioner input at any stage in project design and development. 
Deep Green was driven by the personal vision of its founder, a nurse and public health 
consultant who, following the diagnosis of a brain tumour in 2005 reflected on the need for 
specialised nursing and rehabilitative care for other patients with similar afflictions as she 
made her recovery. She developed the Deep Green care model alongside a business partner 
with experience of the social enterprise market in the North West of England. Deep Green 
were offered the opportunity to develop a building on a large site in South West Leeds but 
in order to progress with this, they first needed to establish a proof of concept at a smaller 
site. Whilst Deep Green successfully developed a service delivery model throughout 2013, 
achieved Cabinet Office backing and finance, and independently engaged a social investor, 
they failed to achieve crucial support from the three relevant local CCGs necessary to secure 
further funding from the Big Lottery Fund, required to move the project further along. The 
CCGs felt the project did not fill a gap in existing service provision and that Deep Green 
lacked sufficient experience as a service provider and were seen as a high-risk investment.  
Deep Green therefore ceased their attempts to develop a SIB in Leeds in the summer of 
2014 (FSquared Ltd, 2014). 
 
  
P a g e  | 40 
 
 
Table 4.5: Main characteristics of the Leeds SIB 
 
Timeframe 
(expected) Start date Not applicable 
(expected) End date Not applicable 
Parties involved 
Service provider Deep Green CIC 
Commissioner Leeds North CCG, Leeds South and East CCG, Leeds West CCG 
Intermediary No specialist SIB intermediary (limited advice taken by Social Finance), but 
two different Management Consultancies and legal advice sought from 
Capsticks LLP 
Investors Interest from Bridges and others – but nothing formalized 
Focus of the SIB 
Type of target population 18-64 year old patients with very complex needs due to physical health 
conditions 
Size of target population 70-100 patients  
Problem tackled by the SIB Improve intensive rehabilitation for patients with long term neurological 
conditions (e.g. multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s, Huntington’s, epilepsy, 
congenital conditions, Acquired Brain Injury, with physical manifestations, 
Spinal Injury, learning disabilities with complex physical needs, people 
requiring mechanical ventilation / other highly technical support, young 
physically disabled) who require have need for nursing support 
Type of services proposed 
Active case management including at-home nursing service with mobile 
nurses overseeing care delivered by family, friends and hired care, backed 
up by a nursing care facility as an alternative to hospital admission when 
patient condition deteriorated and  for post-hospital Intermediate Care and 
rehabilitation, in addition to long term residential care and respite. 
Geographic remit West Yorkshire (Leeds, Bradford, Wakefield, Calderdale, Kirklees) 
Outcome-based component of the SIB 
Outcome metrics Reduction in hospital admissions for each patient 
Type of target Admissions avoided 0.8-1 per cohort member 
Data collection to measure outcomes Before and After (based on 3 years historical GP clinical systems data) 
Is the provider payment based on outcomes? Final value (was) to be negotiated with commissioners 
Contractual relationships (specify actual or proposed) 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and investors? 
No 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and service providers? 
No 
Is there a contract between investors and 
service providers? 
No 
Is there an SPV? No 
Investment 
Investors already on board Informal discussions held 
Size of each contribution Not applicable  
Sources: this table is based on fieldwork information as well as the following references: Halfpenny, P and 
Hotchkiss, J. (2014) Deep Green Care Community CIC Business Plan: proof of concept stage 2014-2018, and 
FSquared Ltd (2014) Deep Green Care Community CIC: Developing a provider led Social Impact Bond 
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Figure 4.5, Proposed SIB model, Leeds 
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Manchester  
 
In 2011, Manchester City Council invited Social Finance “to conduct a feasibility study into 
potential new interventions to safely reduce the numbers of children in residential care, 
improve outcomes, reduce costs” (Cabinet Office [no date], no page), thereby considering 
SIBs as a funding mechanism. 
 
Social Finance advised Manchester City Council on an intervention that would provide an 
intensive fostering service for adolescents aged 11-14, an intervention called Multi-
dimensional Treatment Foster Care - Adolescents (MTFC-A), as an alternative to local 
authority residential care for those young people that meet the criteria  (Social Finance [No 
date c]). In brief, within Multi-dimensional Treatment Foster Care, foster carers are trained 
to provide MTFC in order to help addressing children’s emotional and behavioural 
difficulties (Action for Children [no date]). The one-year MTFC programme includes 
encouraging the development of academic skills, setting boundaries, supporting the 
establishment of contact with pro-social peers and maintaining close supervision of the child 
(Cabinet Office [no date]). 
 
As a result, the Manchester City Council commissioned an MTFC-A intervention to move at 
least 95 children aged 11-14 with behavioural and emotional issues from local authority 
residential care to more stable, family-based placements (Roberts 2013). Action for Children 
was selected as the service provider from amongst the bids received.  
 
Within the process, Social Finance “provided Manchester with hands-on experience in 
developing new ways of bringing private and philanthropic sector investment into projects 
for social good” (Cabinet Office [no date], no page).  Furthermore, throughout the SIB 
development process, Social Finance has an on-going advisory role. 
 
The Manchester City Council SIB was signed between the commissioner and Action for 
Children in February 2014 and will run for eight years, with services delivered over five years 
(Griffiths and Meinicke 2014). Because Manchester City Council determined that it could not 
discharge its statutory safeguarding duties to an SPV, but could to Action for Children, no 
SPV was put in place for this SIB. Instead, Action for Children is in a contractual relationship 
with both the commissioner and the investors, but no contractual relationship exists 
between the investors and the commissioner.  
 
Risk is distributed across all partners in this SIB, including the service provider. Action for 
Children will receive additional payments for improvements on the same metrics as the 
investors.  
 
In the first year, up to eight young people will be placed into the programme, and if 
successful, this will increase to 16 people from year two (Cabinet Office [no date]). Over the 
lifetime of the SIB, 95 children in total are expected to go through the programme. Outcome 
payments are made on the basis of getting and keeping children out of residential care 
(Cabinet Office [no date]). Furthermore, ‘bonus’ outcome metrics include improving young 
people’s outcomes (e.g. school attendance, behaviour, and positive activities) (Cabinet 
Office [no date]).  
P a g e  | 43 
 
 
 
The contract value is around £8m in total (for five years), with Bridges Ventures investing 
£1.2m (Action for Children [no date]; Bridges Ventures 2014). Top-up payment will come 
from the Cabinet Office Social Outcomes Fund grant that contributes up to nine per cent of 
the outcome payments (Roberts 2013). The Cabinet Office contribution to outcome 
payments will be proportionally higher in the early years of the programme and then will 
decrease over time, averaging nine per cent over the period of the SIB.  
 
An independent evaluation of the implementation of the initiative has been completed. No 
independent evaluation is planned for the operation of the initiative, but an internal 
evaluation by the commissioner is ongoing. 
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Table 4.6: Main characteristics of the Manchester MTFC-A SIB 
 
Timeframe 
(expected) Start date 
October/November 2014 
(expected) End date After 8 years (services delivered over 5 years) 
Parties involved 
Service provider Action for Children 
Commissioner Manchester City Council 
Intermediary 
None, although there is an on-going advisory role for Social Finance.  
Investors Bridges Ventures 
 
Independent evaluation Name could not be confirmed (evaluation completed during 
implementation phase). Internal evaluation ongoing during the course of 
the intervention. 
Focus of the SIB 
Type of target population Children aged 11-14 years with highest level of need who are placed in 
residential care and have challenging behaviour. 
Size of target population 
Approximately 95 children during the five years of the programme. 
Problem tackled by the SIB High social and financial costs of high numbers of young people in 
residential care. 
Type of services proposed Multi-dimensional Treatment Foster Care—Adolescents (MTFC-A) 
Geographic remit Manchester 
Outcome-based component of the SIB 
Outcome metrics Number of children moved from residential care to foster placements. 
Bonus outcome metrics: improved school attendance, better behaviour and 
wider wellbeing.  
Type of target Absolute targets. Young person engaged in MTFC-A programme, moved out 
of residential placement, achieving all wellbeing outcomes  
Benchmark is data on 11-14 year-olds in residential care from 2007 to 2008. 
Data collection to measure outcomes 
This information has been extrapolated from outcome payments 
information: 
- Number of young people who are on the MTFC programme and 
hence not requiring residential care 
- Number of weeks programme graduates remain in family setting, 
and 
- Wellbeing measures (to be recorded at graduation from MTFC and 
12 months after graduation) 
 
Is the provider payment based on outcomes? Payment is based on outcomes, predominantly on the basis of getting and 
keeping young people out of residential care. 
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‘Bonus’ outcome metrics include improving young people’s outcomes (e.g. 
school attendance, behaviour, and positive activities).  
Contractual relationships (specify actual or proposed) 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and investors? No, actual. 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and service providers? 
Yes, actual  
Is there a contract between investors and 
service providers? Yes, actual. 
Is there an SPV? No, actual 
Investment 
Investors already on board Yes  
Size of each contribution The Bridges Social Impact Bond Fund will provide £1.2m working capital for 
the scheme. 
 
Sources: this table is based on fieldwork information as well as the following references: Action for Children 
2014; Action for Children [no date]; Cabinet Office [no date]; Bridges Venture [no date]; Griffiths and Meinicke 
2014; HM Government [no date]; Roberts 2013; Social Finance [no date a]; (Social Finance [no date c]). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6, SIB model, Manchester 
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Newcastle  
 
In 2011, the Voluntary Organisations’ Network North East (VONNE), with other interested 
parties, learned about SIBs after a presentation by Social Finance. Following this 
presentation, VONNE came together with other people and chief executives from voluntary 
organisations to discuss this topic. Subsequently, VONNE made £5,000 available to gauge 
interest in a SIB for the North East of England.  A few individuals with experience in (social) 
investment conducted this exercise and found that there was an appetite for addressing 
long-term health conditions in the area. 
 
A CCG in the west of Newcastle upon Tyne put forth a proposal to develop a SIB to improve 
long-term health conditions (LTCs) through social prescribing, defined as “the use of non-
medical interventions to achieve sustained healthy behaviour change and improved self-
care” (VONNE 2014b). The intervention promotes physical activity, healthy eating and social 
interaction (for example through taking part in local activities. A steering group was 
convened to seek out SEIF funding to support the initial development stages of the project. 
The steering group included representatives from VONNE, the NHS Newcastle West CCG 
(NWCCG), the Cabinet Office and organisations that work with or represent the Voluntary 
and Community Sector (ACEVO, CapitaliSE and Business Mind Social Purpose). In addition to 
SEIF funding, other development funding included £15,000 by ACEVO and £150,000 in 
technical assistance funding by the Big Lottery Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund 
(VONNE 2014b). 
 
In December 2013, the steering group became a sub-committee when the SPV, Ways to 
Wellness Ltd (WTW) was established (VONNE 2014b). Ways to Wellness is a charitable 
foundation with an operating arm, in which the charity foundation (consisting of 
independent directors) controls the operating arm and has the purpose to disseminate good 
practice about social prescribing for people with LTCs. The operating arm, which consists of 
a paid board of directors, is responsible for the delivery of the SIB, holding the contract with 
the commissioner, and for managing the providers. Parties in the board of directors include, 
among others, someone from Newcastle West CCG and VONNE. 
 
In June 2014, after a procurement process, four providers were appointed to deliver the 
social prescribing service under a two-year contract, with tasks including employing and 
managing the so-called Link workers who support patients with long-term conditions 
through social prescribing (VONNE 2014a; Ways to Wellness 2014).  
 
Commissioned by the NWCCG, Big Lottery Fund’s Commissioning Better Outcomes and the 
Cabinet Office’s Social Outcomes Fund (see below for role Big Lottery Fund and Cabinet 
Office), Ways to Wellness will be funded through a SIB. In the first year of the SIB, the 
program is expecting 1,091 successful referrals.  It is assumed that a proportion of patients 
will disrupt their placements and drop off a program resulting in 866 patients on the 
program. Over the course of the seven year CCG contract, base case assumption is 11,141 
successfully engaged beneficiaries.  Outcome payments are paid out based on the 
achievement of agreed outcome metric targets. Social investment is secured from Bridges 
Ventures and the Newcastle Healthcare Charity.  This is a full risk investment and there is no 
fixed coupon or secured level of return.   
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Two metrics were selected in order to measure outcomes of the intervention: achieved 
Improvement of the outcomes on the Wellbeing Star and savings for secondary care acute 
usage. The Wellbeing Star is a patient-recorded metric through which progress in eight 
areas of a patient’s health and wellbeing is measured. Patients in the WTW programme will 
complete the Wellbeing Star every six months, with typically four stars (spanning 21 
months) to be completed per patient. Furthermore, secondary care costs measured include 
inpatient and outpatient usage and Accident and Emergency usage. With support from a 
tool called RAIDR (Reporting, Analysis and Intelligence Delivering Results), which extracts 
data from GP IT systems, secondary care data from the WTW cohort will be compared with 
secondary care data from a control group in Newcastle North and Newcastle East. 
Throughout the first six years, the Big Lottery Fund (up to £2m) and the Cabinet Office (up 
to £1m) will provide payments based on improvements on the Wellbeing Star only (WTW 
internal document). The commissioner will pay for both outcomes on the Wellbeing Star 
and outcomes in terms of secondary care costs from year two-three onwards (WTW internal 
document).  
 
The SIB is expected to be operational in April 2015 and intends to run for seven years 
(VONNE 2014a; Ways to Wellness 2014; VONNE, 2014c).  
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Table 4.7: Main characteristics of the Newcastle SIB 
 
Timeframe 
(expected) Start date April 2015 
(expected) End date 2022  
Parties involved 
Service provider Changing Lives, First Contact Clinical, HealthWORKS Newcastle and Mental 
Health Concern  
Commissioner NHS Newcastle West CCG 
Intermediary There is no formal intermediary; VONNE initiated and helped setting up 
WTW, later being part of the operating arm of WTW, together with other 
parties 
Investors Bridges Ventures and Newcastle Healthcare Charity 
SPV Ways to Wellness Ltd 
Focus of the SIB 
Type of target population People with long-term health conditions 
Size of target population 866 engaged clients in the first year; 4,100 expected in year ten (cumulative 
live patients on the program) 
Problem tackled by the SIB Long-term health conditions (LTCs) 
Type of services proposed Social prescribing (through Link workers) 
Geographic remit Newcastle West 
Outcome-based component of the SIB 
Outcome metrics 1. Achieved Improvement of the outcomes on the Wellbeing Star 
2. Savings for secondary care acute usage 
 
Type of target Improved health and wellbeing and a reduction in use of secondary care. 
Data collection to measure outcomes 1. Wellbeing Star 
2. Secondary care data of the WTW cohort will be compared with secondary 
care data from a control group cohort in Newcastle North and East CCG.  A 
tool called RAIDR will be used to extract data from GP IT systems.   
Is the provider payment based on outcomes? Payments to the providers are partially outcome-based. Proposed payments 
to providers will have three components: 
1. Base payment: based on the number of Link workers as commissioned by 
Ways to Wellness to employ. 
2. Referral payment: first part (£125) for every patient referred and 
accepted as a client; second part (£100) on completion of Wellbeing Star 6 
months after referral. 
3. Continuation payment: payment of £50 at 15 months after referral and 
every 6 months thereafter during engagement of client. This payment will 
be performance based. 
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Contractual relationships (specify actual or proposed)2 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and investors? 
No. Proposed model is that Ways to Wellness holds contract with social 
investor. 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and service providers? 
No. Proposed contract between CCG and Ways to Wellness. 
Is there a contract between investors and 
service providers? 
No. There will be a contract between Ways to Wellness and providers, as 
Ways to Wellness procures the services. 
Is there an SPV? (actual) SPV Ways to Wellness Ltd  
Investment 
Investors already on board Yes 
Size of each contribution - Bridges Ventures: £1.65m 
- Newcastle Healthcare Charity: £50,000 
Sources: this table is based on fieldwork information as well as the following references: VONNE 2014a; Ways 
to Wellness 2014. 
 
 
Figure 4.7, Proposed SIB model, Newcastle 
 
 
                                                     
2 All based on Ways to Wellness procurement prospectus (Ways to Wellness 2014) 
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Shared Lives (Manchester, Lambeth) 
 
Shared Lives is a service where individual carers share their family and community lives with 
the disabled adults and older people in need of care, supporting them in daily life. In practice, 
this can mean that an individual is a regular daytime or overnight visitor to his or her carer’s 
household, or that the individual moves in with the carer (Shared Lives Plus 2012a). People 
who use Shared Lives find a sense of belonging with their carer; other potential social benefits 
of these people being active, valued citizens are still emerging (Shared Lives 2012a). Shared 
Lives is used by about 15,000 people altogether in almost every area of the UK (Social Finance 
2013b). Most local authorities manage or commission a Shared Lives service, but this service 
is often small-scale and directly managed by local authorities. Supported by the Cabinet 
Office, Social Finance, Shared Lives Plus and Community Catalysts worked with four local 
authorities—Lambeth, Leeds, Manchester and Newham—to develop a model to expand 
Shared Lives using social investment. This work found that expanding Shared Lives can 
provide significantly greater value for money than many other forms of care 
(Incubator@community catalysts 2013). 
 
Community Catalysts, MacIntyre, Social Finance and Shared Lives Plus have partnered 
together to establish a Shared Lives Incubator. The incubator aims to support the success of 
Shared Lives schemes that receive social or other investment for an agreed period (usually 3-
5 years) (Incubator@community catalysts 2013).  
 
After independent procurement processes in Lambeth and Manchester, preferred providers 
for delivery of the services have been identified and are in process of being confirmed. It is 
expected that the SIB in Manchester will go live in April 2015, and it is expected that the 
Shared Lives SIB in Lambeth will start in June 2015.  
 
It seems unlikely at present that the SIB model will be set up in Leeds and Newham as local 
authorities have chosen to re-evaluate the appropriate means to provide Shared Lives care in 
their respective areas. Therefore, Table 4.8 below is primarily based on the developments in 
Manchester (and where possible Lambeth). Additionally, two further sites at locations yet to 
be determined are currently being considered within this SIB initiative, with an intention of 
providing the SIB-based Shared Lives service across four locations. All four sites would intend 
to reach up to 250 individuals in total, with outcome payments made based on the number 
of new Shared Lives care placements established (Jupp and Shirley, 2015). 
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Table 4.8: Main characteristics of the Shared Lives SIB 
 
Timeframe 
(expected) Start date Manchester: April 2015  
Lambeth: June 2015 
(expected) End date 2020 for both  
Parties involved 
Service provider Identified STC 
Commissioner Manchester: Manchester City Council; Lambeth: Lambeth Council 
Intermediary Social Finance, as part of the Shared Lives Incubator. Social Finance will have 
a performance management role when the scheme is live. 
Investors Big Society Capital, Esmeé Fairbairn foundation, John Ellerman Foundation 
SPV Shared Lives Investment Fund (SF supports this SPV) 
Focus of the SIB 
Type of target population Disabled adults and older people in need of care 
Size of target population Up to 250 individuals across four schemes 
Problem tackled by the SIB Lack of community care options for vulnerable adults; high cost of existing 
forms of care. 
Type of services proposed  An alternative to home care and care homes for people in need of support, 
with support instead provided through living with a host family. Shared 
Lives offers personalised, quality care where carers share their lives and 
often their homes with those they support. 
Geographic remit Lambeth and Manchester plus two others TBD to replace Newham and 
Leeds. 
Outcome-based component of the SIB 
Outcome metrics Number of new Shared Lives care placements established. A university has 
been commissioned to develop a broader outcome measuring tool. 
Type of target Delivery of stable long term placements for individuals.  
Other outcomes might be improvement of independence of vulnerable 
adults and reductions in difficult behaviour. 
Data collection to measure outcomes 1. Each local commissioner will provide a benchmarking of 
performance of local services 
2. Benchmarking against national adult social care services 
Measurement will be conducted by providers. 
Is the provider payment based on outcomes? Yes.  
Contractual relationships (specify actual or proposed) 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and investors? 
(actual) No 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and service providers? 
(proposed) Yes  
Is there a contract between investors and 
service providers? 
(proposed) Yes 
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Is there an SPV? (actual) Shared Lives Investment Fund 
Investment 
Investors already on board Yes - £1.1M to cover four areas. 
Size of each contribution Size of investment is between £200,000 to £350,000 per provider.3 
Sources: this table is based on fieldwork information as well as the following references: Lambeth Corporate 
Procurement Team 2013; Shared Lives Plus 2012b; Social Finance 2013a; Social Finance 2013b; The London 
Borough of Lambeth 2014. 
 
Figure 4.8, Proposed SIB model, Shared Lives 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
3 Exact size of investments to be confirmed. 
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Thames Reach 
  
The Thames Reach SIB seeks to reduce rough sleeping and improve social outcomes for a 
named cohort of 415 people in the Greater London area by delivering an intensive, 
personalised set of services through outreach navigators. The Department for Communities 
and Local Government (DCLG) and the Greater London Authority (GLA) initiated the project 
in 2012 with the goal of reducing homelessness in London through social investment. At the 
onset, commissioners invited Social Finance and the Young Foundation to conduct a 
feasibility study as to whether SIBs were appropriate for use in a rough sleeping 
intervention, and at a later date, to identify outcome metrics for measuring success. Social 
Finance and the Young Foundation drew on data from the Combined Homelessness and 
Information Network (CHAIN) to develop a social benefit model with the following outcome 
metrics: a reduction in rough sleeping, as recorded by street outreach teams; a move to 
settled accommodation (not a hostel) with tariffs paid out if sustained for 6, 12, and 18 
consecutive months; reconnections with home country; to be in employment or training 
(e.g. obtaining NVQ2, volunteering for 8+ hours a week, being in part or full time 
employment); and, a reduction in visits to A&E. The subsequent GLA tender invited service 
providers to present a service designed to meet these five outcome metrics where bidders 
identified their own target levels. Social Finance assisted the DCLG and GLA, in an advisory 
role during the tender process, and was not involved in the development of any bids for the 
contract.  
The GLA commissioned two provider organisations, Thames Reach and St. Mungo’s 
Broadway to deliver concurrent SIBs, estimated at £4.5 million across both providers. This 
evaluation only looks at the Thames Reach SIB as they received SEIF funding.  The SIBs were 
launched in November 2012 and will run for three years. The DCLG will pay outcomes until 
February 2016. Each provider has a cohort of 415 individuals identified as entrenched rough 
sleepers. Neither organisation has disclosed their payment tariffs or rate of success in 
achieving outcomes. The target population was identified as any individuals seen sleeping 
rough more than six times between July-September 2012, based on CHAIN data. Thames 
Reach, the lead service provider, chose to also invest directly in the SIB alongside several 
other socially-minded investors, including the Big Issue and the Monument Trust among 
others. The GLA and Thames Reach signed a contract where Thames Reach is reimbursed 
entirely by results.  
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Table 4.9: Main characteristics of the Thames Reach SIB 
 
Timeframe 
(expected) Start date November 2012 
(expected) End date November 2015, outcomes to be paid until February 2016 
Parties involved 
Service provider Thames Reach 
Commissioner Greater London Authority (GLA) 
Intermediary Social Finance and the Young Foundation developed the service 
specification and measurement metrics for use prior to tender 
Investors Big Issue, Thames Reach, Monument Trust, others 
Focus of the SIB 
Type of target population Rough sleepers in the greater London area 
Size of target population 415 named individuals  
Problem tackled by the SIB Homelessness 
Type of services proposed Navigators monitor cohort closely. Work with service recipients to develop 
personalised approach tailored to individuals (e.g. assist to find housing, 
swimming lessons etc.) 
Geographic remit Greater London Area 
Outcome-based component of the SIB 
Outcome metrics Reduction in rough sleeping; moved to settled accommodation; 
reconnected with accommodation abroad; increased employment; 
reduction in use of A&E. 
Type of target Absolute targets. Reduction in rough sleeping paid out on quarterly basis, 
other outcome metrics paid out on (continued) achievement at 6, 12, and 
18 months  
Data collection to measure outcomes Reduction in rough sleeping based on historical cohort 
Other outcomes paid out on information submitted to CHAIN database, 
audited by project officer at GLA 
Is the provider payment based on outcomes? 
Yes, the provider is reimbursed entirely by results. 
Contractual relationships (specify actual or proposed) 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and investors? 
No 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and service providers? 
Yes 
Is there a contract between investors and 
service providers? 
Yes 
Is there an SPV? No 
Investment 
Investors already on board Yes 
Size of each contribution 
Final value was negotiated with commissioners and investors, payment 
amounts not disclosed. Not disclosed. 
Sources: this table is based on fieldwork information and Department for Local Communities and Government 
2014. 
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Figure 4.9, SIB model, Thames Reach 
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Worcester  
 
Age UK Herefordshire and Worcestershire (Age UK H&W) have worked in partnership with 
Social Finance to develop a service model to reduce loneliness among older people through 
increased social engagement. The SIB is a targeted intervention to reduce loneliness, and 
thereby lead to improvements in health outcomes (for example, a reduction in depression, 
or delayed onset of dementia). It is expected to benefit service recipients as less socially 
isolated individuals are expected to remain more active (therefore reducing likelihood of 
non-communicable diseases linked to sedentary lifestyles such as diabetes, stroke, coronary 
heart disease, and increased frailty and disability). The SIB will engage a cohort of 5,000 
people, out of 20-30,000 lonely older people in Worcestershire over three years. The target 
population may be identified and recruited through GP referrals, bereavement records or 
identified by local organisations. Service recipients will receive help to attend desired local 
activities, for example, to join a gardening club or befriending service with young people, 
through time-limited support from a trained volunteer. Access to more specialist services 
will also be available such as transport, language & cultural support. This proposed service 
expects that increased social engagement will lead to a reduction in use of health care 
services (decrease in visits to GP or A&E and delayed entry to residential care). Outcomes 
will be measured by a reduction in loneliness as measured by the R-UCLA loneliness scale 
(psychometric tool, 4 attributes, 3 point scale) at 0, 6 and 18 months after joining the 
service (Russell 1996).  
Worcestershire Council, Redditch and Bromsgrove CCG, South Worcestershire CCG, and 
Wyre Forest CCG were involved with the project as part of their Well-Connected Programme 
bid to become a national Integrated Care Pioneer. The local commissioners were interested 
in Identifying potential interventions to tackle complex social issues affecting older people, 
and to assess the potential benefits and savings emerging from these interventions. To 
address this, they invited Social Finance to conduct a pre-feasibility study for a SIB, in 
partnership with Age UK H&W. The proposed SIB and cost-benefit model was presented and 
agreed, in principle, by the commissioners in November 2013. There was a long delay 
between the agreement to commission a project targeting social isolation and the tender 
release in September 2014. This was attributed to the novelty of SIB procurement. As Social 
Finance was heavily involved in service design, they were considered unable to act as 
neutral intermediary to expedite the procurement process. Social Finance has partnered 
with Age UK H&W in its SIB bid and are awaiting the outcome of the competitive tender. 
Bids were submitted on 31 October 2014 and the preferred bidder will be announced in 
February 2015.  Until then, it is unclear who the likely investors will be, how the payment 
structure will be designed (i.e. whether Age UK H&W enter a risk-sharing agreement with 
prospective investors) and what the agreed investor rates of return will be.  
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Table 4.10: Main characteristics of the Worcestershire SIB 
 
Timeframe 
(expected) Start date April 2015 
(expected) End date April 2019 
Parties involved 
Service provider Age UK Herefordshire and Worcestershire 
Commissioner Worcestershire Council, Redditch and Bromsgrove CCG, South 
Worcestershire CCG and Wyre Forest CCG, and Cabinet Office contributions 
to outcomes payments 
Intermediary Social Finance, co-designer 
Investors Nothing formalised as commissioners will announce preferred bidders in 
February 
Focus of the SIB 
Type of target population Lonely older people 
Size of target population 
5000 individuals 
Problem tackled by the SIB To reduce loneliness and social isolation among older people 
Type of services proposed To develop personalised service packages to engage individuals with local 
community activities (e.g. befriending services, gardening club etc.) 
Geographic remit Worcestershire 
Outcome-based component of the SIB 
Outcome metrics Reduction in loneliness using R-UCLA loneliness scale (4 attributes, 3 point 
scale) 
Type of target Relative to individual’s answer to survey at 0, 6 and 18 months after 
intervention 
Data collection to measure outcomes Not yet defined 
Is the provider payment based on outcomes? To be negotiated 
Contractual relationships (specify actual or proposed) 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and investors? 
No 
Is there a contract between commissioners 
and service providers? 
No 
Is there a contract between investors and 
service providers? 
No 
Is there an SPV? No 
Investment 
Investors already on board Informal discussions held 
Size of each contribution N/A 
Sources: this table is based on fieldwork information. 
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Figure 4.10, Proposed SIB model, Worcester (if using SPV) 
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5.  Early findings from interviews 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents interim thematic findings from interviews with service providers, 
commissioners, intermediary parties and investors involved in the ten SIB Trailblazers in 
health and social care.  Overall, the Trailblazers are notable for their diversity of providers, 
in service objectives, commissioning arrangements, levels of intermediary support, and 
target populations.  While the projects are wide ranging, there were some commonalities in 
the often lengthy negotiation processes, motivations for pursuing a SIB contract and issues 
around the measurement and attribution of SIB interventions.  Most of our findings relate 
to the early SIB contract process as five of the Trailblazers remain in development, but we 
offer some lessons where possible on two of the operational SIB projects (Essex, Thames 
Reach) and other insights where a SIB will not proceed (East Lancashire, Leeds).  
 
Negotiations 
 
Establishing the feasibility of a SIB requires extensive negotiation processes between 
commissioners, service providers, and financial intermediaries to agree on a policy problem, 
identify a potential solution, design the intervention’s outcomes and payment schedule, and 
determine what the best way to fund the service is. If a SIB is identified as a potential 
funding route, further negotiations follow between commissioners, obliged to follow rules 
around competitive bidding and procurement, service providers and intermediaries.  At the 
end of this process, an often lengthy tender process ensues, ending in a single preferred 
bidder, who may or may not be the organization that took part in the initial planning 
process.  These complexities are due in part to the novelty of the SIB model and to 
unavoidable issues in new forms of commissioning. 
 
Difficulties in the negotiation process 
 
Negotiations around SIB development are complicated by SIBs’ diversity of objectives and 
intervention types. The interviews identified three common hurdles in the negotiation 
process. Firstly, some Trailblazers offer innovative approaches to service delivery (for 
example, Worcester and Leeds), while others are proven programmes (for example, Essex 
and Manchester use interventions with a robust evidence base) where what is innovative is 
the funding mechanism (e.g. pursuing a SIB). The differences in intervention types means 
that experiences from other SIBs in terms of, for example, performance measurement, 
outcome payment thresholds and values, are rarely transferable between SIB-funded 
initiatives. This in turn means that SIB stakeholders must approach each negotiation de novo 
rather than being able to build on existing practice or experience. This first difficulty in a 
sense underpins the second and third difficulties, which relate to general lack of familiarity 
with the SIB commissioning and negotiation processes. 
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A second common difficulty was that SIB contracts require commissioners and service 
providers to collaborate with many new actors, such as intermediaries, lawyers, specialists 
in social investing, and external investors (private or socially motivated). For commissioners, 
SIBs are a new contract type and there are no set processes or checklists for completion, 
especially on how best to accommodate the new actors.  While the Cabinet Office has 
provided a template contract and guidance document since April 2012, in practice, internal 
commissioning processes had to be adapted to for each Trailblazer as new hurdles were 
encountered.  The presence of multiple commissioners (e.g. CCGs and a local authority) also 
presented additional administrative challenges, for example in obtaining sign-off from all 
parties on the final recommendation of the preferred service provider. For the Trailblazers, 
an additional complication was the organisational turbulence and new commissioning 
landscape that followed the Coalition government’s NHS reforms.  This time period 
coincided with many of the Trailblazers’ early negotiations with commissioners. For 
example, in one SIB, procurement was complicated by a change from working alongside 
other organisations to develop the SIB project, to an open tendering process.  
 
The third common hurdle was that commissioners were unfamiliar with contracting for 
outcomes. Many SIBs use cost-benefit models to inform the development of outcomes 
metrics, often on a wholly pay-for-performance basis. This approach was new to some 
commissioners who felt it opened up contracting systems to new forms of scrutiny: 
 
“One of the problems was nobody could unpick what the finances of it all are. The 
existing services are so multiform and various. Some of them are from charitable 
organisations, some are others, some are NHS. If you were to follow a string that 
connected one person’s money going to an organisation, some of them go through 
other CCGs on the way and they’ve got lost in the mists of time and the contracting 
has been ineffectively managed in many ways over the years.” (Commissioner 5) 
 
Proponents of SIBs suggest that they encourage a new and more robust approach to data 
collection by both public and third sector organisations, and that this is associated with 
increased quality, rigour of performance management and greater transparency in client 
referral and selection. Related to this, one site indicated that the payment by results 
mechanism helped define and monitor outcomes better. In Manchester, where an 
established intervention is being used, the increased focus on how the service was being 
provided was expected to lead to greater adherence to the intervention model. The 
interview data suggests that SIB development does indeed open up traditional service 
contracts, and the operational assumptions they are based upon, to a new level of 
examination. This process is often led by intermediary organisations and new potential 
providers. However, the ‘untangling’ of the existing relationships can be slow and difficult.  
 
Determining a fair rate of return for investors presented an added complexity to 
negotiations between multiple actors.  Some informants felt it was important to establish 
rates of return that were attractive enough to interest private or social investors. 
Nevertheless, they also must be sufficiently modest to avoid antagonising public 
commissioners and local politicians who may harbour suspicions of the motivations of those 
potential investors. In a few interviews, health commissioners expressed concerns about 
joining private investors in a SIB contract based on actual, or perceptions of, negative 
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experiences with the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) - commonly viewed as a financing 
mechanism where the public sector has paid out excessively large returns to the private 
sector (Vecchi et al 2013).   
 
Although none of the SIBs are delivering statutory services, a final complication resulting 
from multi-actor negotiation was whether SIBs might put target populations at risk.  
Because what is being funded or invested in are public services for ‘vulnerable’ populations, 
local politicians such as members of Joint Health Overview Scrutiny Committees may be 
involved in discussing potential issues, which in turn may complicate and further delay these 
already complex negotiations.  
 
Development funding 
 
Interviewees from several sites emphasised the importance of development funding for the 
work towards the launch, service design and development stages to support staff 
throughout the negotiations.  A factor that appears to be significant in some sites relates to 
delays in securing development grant funding from the BIG (Big Lottery Fund) once a 
decision to proceed with a SIB contract has been made: 
 
“It’s not unique to it but it is quite a recurring thing with SIBs, partly around the 
complexity but partly because of the grant funding that a number of them work 
under, the need to go back to Big Lottery/Cabinet Office or whatever funding. And 
that is a process that takes time, it’s difficult… Once there’s the option of grant 
funding to support it, the reality is the commissioner’s not going to do anything else 
because it won’t do if it knows that someone else is willing to pay for it. That’s just a 
process so it’s not worse than not having it but as soon as it’s there, it’s going to be 
the only thing they go for because they’re not going to say we want speed over 
money. It ends up being quite a burden for progress.” (Intermediary 10) 
 
The wait for further BIG funds is one (of numerous) factors that has delayed the Sandwell 
SIB. The CCG there found the procedure to access these funds complicated, bureaucratic 
and time consuming. BIG funding requirements also quite strongly affected the 
development of the Leeds SIB as the providers had to prove they had commissioner support 
in order to access further funds before the negotiations had reached a stage at which the 
CCG were ready to agree to give support. This truncated the period that the Leeds providers 
had to convince the commissioners about their project. Many respondents recognised that 
this may be a function of the novelty of the SIB funding process, which over time may be 
overcome.  
 
Tendering processes have been more complicated than usual for some commissioners. 
Additionally, there is a sense from informants (providers, intermediaries and 
commissioners) that the timeframes allocated for tendering, bidding and signing contracts 
were too optimistic in many cases. For example, the Manchester SIB faced significant delays 
linked to managing the legal framework around legal duties (held by Manchester City 
Council) for safeguarding children. The complication was that these legal duties could not be 
discharged through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) as planned, but had to go through the 
provider.  
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The role of the intermediary 
 
The SIB development process has introduced intermediaries as key actors, since they offer 
to bring experience in SIB development, expertise in the identification of outcomes, skills in 
data analysis, and links to potential investors, to the commissioning process.  In the SIB 
Trailblazers, progress toward SIB design and contract negotiations have required close 
working between commissioners, providers and intermediaries to ensure that a proposed 
service or intervention will be of value to the target population and that outcomes are 
based on robust, locally agreed assumptions.  As a result of this process, the roles and 
boundaries between actors tend to become blurred, complicating and delaying the 
negotiation process.   
 
In most cases, intermediaries play a key role in design and negotiation by using their prior 
experience to aid commissioners (and in some instances, providers) with the feasibility and 
modelling work integral to getting a SIB contract out to tender. A few informants suggested 
that there was an unexpected turn in some of the SIB processes, where the intermediaries, 
having delivered this preparatory work, could opt to bid for a role in the delivery of these 
services. From the perspective of other actors, this had the potential to represent a conflict 
of interest, particularly if the intermediary had worked closely with a particular provider to 
design a service or intervention to address a commissioner-defined problem.  In such cases, 
the intermediary and provider would hold an advantage (e.g. greater knowledge about 
commissioner motivations for a proposed service) over other potential providers. A few 
commissioner informants felt that intermediary organisations (and providers) involved in 
early SIB design, who then chose to bid for services were not always as open as possible 
with them through the process. In at least two cases, intermediaries withdrew from an 
advisory role in the development of the SIB (that had been highly valuable for 
commissioners) after the preparatory phase to assist a provider in bidding for a contract.  
Though this was done to minimize a perceived or actual conflict of interest, it could, in turn 
disrupt SIB negotiation and development processes: 
 
“Then we have this awkward period of switching over to the other sides, where we 
cut off all ties with the local authority, because it wouldn't be proper, even just before 
procurement, to have any contact with them or to be talking about things like this. 
Having said that, because we've done most of the development work, I… think there 
are still a few questions for example, to be ironed out, which we haven't [solved] in 
doing this and we knew that that was the next step that we haven’t done that, so I 
think that caused issues for the commissioner not being able to speak to us, because 
we know that there are limitations to the study and we know what needs to be 
done.” (Intermediary 7) 
 
The appearance of potential conflicts of interest during SIB development resonated across 
many of the Trailblazers. In spite of this, intermediary organisations were widely seen as 
crucial to the effective development of SIB projects in health and social care, according to 
interviewees. A number of informants suggested that the process of developing a SIB 
contract would be very difficult without the input of intermediary organisations. 
Commissioners appreciated the analytical skills that intermediaries brought to the process, 
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alongside project management and negotiating expertise. Providers appreciated their 
support in identifying payable outcomes and their links to potential investors.  
 
Some informants highlighted the lack of choice in terms of experienced intermediaries, 
attributing this to the immature nature of the social investment market. This limits the 
degree of competition for intermediary services, with potential impacts upon the costs of 
their services. A further critical point raised by informants related to the commercial 
sensitivity of the details of the SIBs and their contracts which would be of considerable value 
to other potential intermediaries and other potential SIB projects, and the impact of 
information asymmetries associated with protecting commercially sensitive information on 
the contractual negotiations: 
 
“I think there’s an element of it’s a business model for some of the intermediaries as 
well. There’s definitely an element there. There’s maybe not as much sharing there 
because there’s a need to protect your business.” (Government 2) 
 
A key finding so far is that many of the Trailblazers have encountered difficulties and delays 
related to the development and negotiation of SIB contracts. Many informants have 
reported high transaction costs, specifically around the costs of additional staff, lengthy 
negotiation processes, advisory services, of obtaining seed funding and grants from the Big 
Lottery Fund, for example. There was a distinction between provider- and commissioner-led 
SIB project negotiations. The majority of the trailblazer SIBs were commissioner-led or 
received a high degree of input or support from intermediaries, with one exception, the 
provider-initiated and led SIB in Leeds.  The Leeds project will not progress to a SIB and 
negotiations ceased in October 2014 for two main reasons: commissioners did not believe 
that the project would fill a significant gap in existing services; and the potential service 
provider lacked sufficient experience (e.g. as service providers, they lacked a track record of 
success or failure, facilities, and regulatory clearances from the Care Quality Commission).  
The provider felt it was unable to garner sufficient commissioner support for the project. 
The Leeds SIB received less specialist intermediary input than many other projects which 
may also have impacted upon the difficulties faced in the negotiation process.  
 
This leads to two important conclusions at this stage.  Firstly, early and ongoing engagement 
between commissioners and providers was critical to successful negotiations; secondly, 
trailblazers seeking to implement an unproven, innovative model of care for health and 
social care system faced more barriers to successful negotiations. This is explored further in 
the subsequent section on motivations to pursue a SIB. 
 
Motivations  
 
Commissioner-driven yet allowing service innovation 
 
For the most part, the development of the Trailblazers was commissioner-driven and 
motivated by the desire to develop innovative services in response to difficult social 
problems (Thames Reach, Worcester), improve integration (Sandwell), or remedy 
inefficiencies in existing provision (Cornwall). Other strong motivations included the desire 
to expand existing services (Essex, Manchester, Shared Lives). 
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Some commissioners were drawn to SIBs as a funding mechanism because a shift to 
‘payment by results’ (PbR) appeared to be the direction of travel for future commissioning, 
and SIBs offered a risk-free way to explore this shift because in many cases, the financial risk 
of implementing or scaling up interventions was borne by investors.  Others felt SIBs 
allowed commissioners to avoid up-front costs, create financial savings, or were an 
appropriate policy response to shrinking budgets in social care. For example, the Thames 
Reach SIB was the GLA’s first payment for outcomes contract, although the DCLG is paying, 
and offered a new financing mechanism while attempting to transfer commissioning risk to 
providers and investors.  A number of informants suggested that commissioners’ interest in 
SIBs was associated with the drive to foster innovation. This trend was welcomed by service 
providers who felt traditional funding streams, for example, from grant-giving organisations 
or block contracting, encouraged the delivery of programmes focused on short-term, 
narrow, process measures of successful service delivery. In contrast, SIB contracts were seen 
as allowing service providers to pursue preventive interventions with predetermined 
measures of success over longer periods of time. However, it should be noted that the 
impacts of preventive programmes are often hard to quantify. For example, it is difficult to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of a programme that prevents a child from entering foster 
care if this outcome may not be able to be confirmed for several years and if there is no 
counterfactual or even a baseline for comparison. Additionally, SIBs and payment for 
outcomes would also allow commissioners to take a long term perspective.  As one 
intermediary suggested, long term and sustainable changes could not be made in people’s 
lives through a series of short term projects (Intermediary 4).  
 
Several Trailblazers were developed at the invitation of commissioners, who asked 
intermediaries to develop a service that met an identified social problem. The extent of 
intermediary involvement varies by project. In many early cases, the intermediary worked 
closely with the commissioner to develop a service design and tender document, and 
provide on-going assistance in selecting the winning bid(s).  In such cases, SIB outcomes 
were identified from an intermediary’s feasibility study and presented in the tender, as set 
out in the commissioners’ bid specification document.  Service providers were then free to 
design their intervention to meet the specified outcomes, an approach intended to enable 
commissioners to choose from a range of service models to meet their desired outcomes. In 
at least one case, the tender specified the outcome targets constructed by an intermediary 
to address a set of perceived problems (e.g. GLA’s tender for a rough sleeping SIB 
intervention laid out a care pathway for the problem of entrenched rough sleeping). For this 
tender: 
 
 “[T]here was no set threshold of you must achieve this many people off the streets. It 
was just come to us and your bid with a price and with the outcomes you think you 
can achieve.” (Intermediary 7)  
 
In other cases, the commissioner invited the intermediary to work with a service provider to 
develop a service design that was later put out to tender (discussed also under The Role of 
the intermediary, above). Although the commissioner instigated the process in these cases, 
the intermediary often took a lead role and was a named bidder for the project, such as in 
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Sandwell and Worcester SIBs. In these circumstances, it could be difficult to attract other 
intermediaries or service providers to tender bids.  It is unclear if this approach limits 
commissioners’ choice in the service models they choose to tackle the social problem they 
identify.  
 
Financial freedom for service providers 
 
Some service providers were highly motivated to take part in a SIB because SIBs were seen 
as offering financial freedom from shorter grant-giving cycles and process-measure-driven 
contracts.  SIB projects focused on preventive interventions were seen as attractive because 
they would allow time for interventions to bed in, and for outcome metrics to determine 
whether the intervention was working (Newcastle). 
 
Service providers were also drawn to the possibility of future financial gains by investing 
their own capital in the SIB so they could share in potential profits, or, where the provider 
organisation lacked financial reserves for investment in the SIB, a risk-sharing agreement 
could be included in the SIB contract where service providers could gain small financial 
payments for exceeding expectations in some outcome areas. In one site, there was much 
optimism that savings made ‘further down the line which can then be used to pay for the 
Social Impact Bond and also reinvest it in further work’ would benefit commissioners and 
help to grow the service (Provider 6). 
 
The design of SIBs tends to stress the use of outcome over process measures and thus 
potentially enables greater flexibility for service providers in how they deliver services.  A 
few service providers were motivated to implement a SIB because the outcomes contract 
allowed freedom to pursue the outcome in a flexible way and tailor services to the needs of 
individuals. For example, the SIB allowed a service organisation, traditionally limited to block 
contracts using process measures, to pair outreach staff with the target cohort to do: 
 
“[W]hatever it takes for this person, because whatever’s been done up to this point 
clearly hasn’t worked. So it gives [outreach staff] that financial freedom’ to provide 
any services within reason [for example, as part of one service provider’s intervention, 
service recipients received swimming lessons or a television in response to requests 
for entertainment to deter a return to negative, previous behaviours]. This would not 
be possible without outcomes-based contracts.” (Provider 7) 
 
The desire for more flexible funding or to move away from relying solely on statutory 
funding was expressed by a service provider and an intermediary (Provider 3; Intermediary 
2). Other providers were interested in SIBs to demonstrate cashable savings ahead of 
anticipated financial cuts (Manchester, Shared Lives, Newcastle, and Cornwall). 
  
Pilots 
 
A small number of trailblazer projects were being developed as pilot projects for future 
application in a SIB. In Cornwall, there has been a substantial drive to demonstrate that a 
vision of personalised care plans, delivered by voluntary sector organisations, will lead to 
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demonstrable cost savings in secondary acute care by experimenting with the delivery of 
innovative, untested services: 
 
“The perfect world is to get something funded by the public sector, but actually, if 
you’re looking at doing something different, the way we were looking at doing 
something different, especially colleagues in Health, they’ll go, “Ooh, yes, what does 
your evidence base look like?” (Provider 10) 
 
It was suggested that this could be mitigated through a SIB model as social investors and 
philanthropic organisations might be drawn to provide funding if there was a social good 
served, with the potential for future payments, in return for delivering a riskier, untested 
new service. 
 
At the national policy level, it was suggested that SIBs function as a method to pilot policy 
projects ahead of wider roll out:  
 
“I think some of their interest and this is their interest in social investment more broadly, 
is in finding new ways for the organisations that they work with and they’re trying to 
support to access markets and to access funding. They know that where a foundation... 
what often they will do is they grant fund innovation where no one else will go. But 
ultimately they want that scaled up and they want that delivered across the country. The 
majority of the time the only way it’s going to happen is if the government commissions 
it.” (Government 2) 
 
In other sites, especially within social care, a SIB served as a pilot to demonstrate that an 
existing model could work in other areas (Manchester) or show that existing services could 
work on a larger scale (Cornwall, Shared Lives, Newcastle).  
 
Perceived benefits of involvement of private financier in health and social services 
 
A common justification for the introduction of SIBs in health and social care is the perceived 
need to instil ‘market discipline’ in the third sector. Some informants felt that voluntary 
sector organisations involved in SIBs would benefit from greater performance management 
and accountability to government and grant-giving funders, and greater rigour in 
demonstrating improved outcomes and better service delivery. In others, the emphasis was 
on the benefits of the shift to payment for outcomes. At the macro policy level, some 
informants regarded SIBs and related payment for outcomes as the future direction of 
commissioning, with one policy maker saying that: 
 
“[T]he outsourcing of public services is probably unlikely to stop. A focus on outcomes 
is a relatively obvious thing to be doing. So I think people see generally that Social 
Impact Bonds could and should be playing quite a big role in public services going 
forward.” (Government 2) 
 
Many of the service delivery providers involved with the Trailblazers were larger, more 
entrepreneurial organisations within the Third Sector with a strong interest in increasing 
financial flows to increase social impact. Some Third Sector service providers were keen to 
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embrace SIBs as a way to build capacity, with one service provider suggesting that the Third 
Sector was currently “not equipped to manage, to create the data and evidence that you 
need to have’ to meet the rigour of outcome payments” (Provider 4). For others, the SIB 
model was seen as leading to greater rigour in performance management and accountability 
and greater transparency.  
 
A few informants expressed concerns about the potential for perverse incentives and the 
downsides associated with other payment for performance schemes or external target 
setting. These informants felt that it was important that outcome metrics were designed in 
a way that they would not inadvertently work to the disadvantage of the target population. 
At the national level, one service provider felt SIBs offered a more inclusive pathway to 
collaborative, locally-designed service provision than previous health care reforms, 
characterised by top-down, externally imposed targets. At the local level, collaborative 
design was perceived as beneficial to providers and a departure from the logic of recent 
reforms in health care:  
 
“That's the kind of behavioural change that you don't get through training, you don't get 
through regulations, you don't get through performance management, you only get by 
working with teams on the ground. So I think the thing that we're trying to do is create a 
whole system change by working the community up, so by really galvanising those 2,500 
voluntary sector organisations to be the frontline for people and to enable people who 
have long-term conditions, are naturally those that use and consume a lot of health and 
social resources, to be able to give them something else than just formal care as an 
option.” (Provider 9) 
 
Measurement 
 
The importance of measurement for SIB design and delivery has emerged as a significant 
theme. Agreement of metrics to understand both the problem at hand and the most 
appropriate outcome measures is essential to SIB negotiations, with one service provider 
saying “the first key lesson is make certain that you get people coming together around the 
data… [T]he data bit is the thing that will make or break it.” (Provider 10). This is a 
complicated process, not least because it is difficult to put monetary figures on social 
outcomes, as suggested by one informant. 
 
Data analytical capacity 
 
SIBs are expected to drive a change in Third Sector culture around data collection capacity 
and monitoring. Beyond payments for outcomes, other indicators that are or will be 
measured as part of certain SIBs include assessing whether providers are meeting volume 
requirements or additional outcomes for service users. There was a lack of consensus from 
informants around how firm or flexible agreed metrics ought to be once set. For example, 
informants from the Essex SIB emphasised the value of working with metrics that might 
change over time and informants from the Thames Reach SIB felt the outcome target might 
be unachievably high for some metrics like education or volunteering and fail to 
compensate providers for strong efforts made. In other cases, informants suggested that 
firmness of metrics would be viewed as an attractive element for investors.  
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Improving tools to measure programme effectiveness is expected to increase accountability. 
This shift is intended to help service providers to deliver better services for their target 
populations. There is also the expectation that introducing measurement of outcomes 
makes service providers, commissioners and intermediaries more accountable for their use 
of public money. In the case of the London rough sleeping SIB, for example, it was stated: 
 
“[T]hat extra layer of proof has been required but only really for SIB. Other services 
don’t have to provide evidence on the system, it’s just taken that if someone records a 
bedded down street contact, that’s because that happened. They would have to have 
shift notes but they wouldn’t have to upload those.” (Intermediary 9).  
 
The Essex SIB produces a monthly ‘dashboard’ which captures the analysis carried out by 
the intermediary into the effectiveness of the project, to enable early identification of 
underperformance on specific metrics. In Essex as well as in other sites, as noted earlier, 
there is a strong sense that alleged traditional failures to monitor performance (in both 
operational and financial terms) by public sector and charitable organisations can be 
alleviated by SIB-inspired reforms related to measurement and performance management. 
Therefore, the importance of investing in resources for data collection and analysis is 
stressed by many informants. Reflecting this, many SIB models include the commissioning of 
bespoke information management systems, which in some cases require new or specialised 
staff.  
 
There is some tension around the appropriate role of intermediaries or service providers in 
data monitoring. If the purpose of a SIB is to improve the voluntary sector’s capacity to 
monitor and evaluate a service, it is reasonable to expect that new funds (via SPV or direct 
investment) be used to scale up internal capacity and data monitoring. Another view is that 
SIBs introduce rigorous performance monitoring, where an external party (i.e. intermediary) 
should be responsible for collecting data and measuring progress against outcomes. It is 
unclear whether the introduction of third-party monitoring and evaluation is detrimental to 
service providers’ efforts to scale up internal measurement capacity.  Although most 
informants agreed that independent evaluations were important to assess the effectiveness 
of SIB interventions, few projects were able to incorporate an independent evaluation of 
either the SIB process or intervention outcomes due to financial constraints.  However, at 
least one project currently under consideration does include an independent evaluation by 
a third party in the current tender specification.   
 
SIBs vary in the amount of new and existing data to be collected; in some cases, routine data 
are used and compared against a historical ‘before treatment’ group, while others will rely 
on administering psychometric surveys to clients at the start and end of the project to see 
how clients have benefited from the service provided through the SIB. The new emphasis on 
data requirements has created additional pressure for some providers, but some informants 
held positive views about increased data collection requirements of SIBs. One informant 
(optimistically) proposed that having to define objectives had forced people to identify the 
purpose of social care (Intermediary 2).  
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The need for clarity in outcomes and agreement with respect to measurement, whilst 
absolutely key, may not be simple – especially when delivery involves joint commissioning 
across health and social care: 
 
“[T]he problem in the health and social care sector is what we touched on earlier. 
Budgets and responsibilities sit in two different places. So while ...ultimately your 
outcome might be around reduced hospital admissions whatever, which is where your 
savings for the actual intervention is in the social care space. It’s [about] how do you 
join those two things up? In theory an outcomes based approach should make that 
easier than actually linking up those two different bits of the health service can be 
really difficult… I think that is quite a big problem. It’s hard enough doing a SIB with 
one commissioner than trying to do it across two.” (Government 2) 
 
Differences in health care commissioning and local authority commissioning may complicate 
and delay negotiations around the development of methods for measurement, as, for 
example, respondents argued that local authorities tended to have less experience with 
contracting for outcomes. Because of the typical lack of data collection and measurement in 
social care, one informant thought that social care was lacking in comparison to health in 
this regard (Intermediary 2). However, another intermediary representative argued 
measurement structures need to be simpler in order for the SIB model to be adapted to 
other sites in the future, suggesting that greater complexity would hamper SIB 
development. Nevertheless, the ongoing economic climate was cited as a strong 
motivational force for CCGs and local authorities to improve the robustness of their 
measurement regimes to demonstrate value for money for funded projects. 
 
Attribution 
 
The other major measurement issue identified relates to the attribution of outcomes to 
SIBs. This was recognised to be of great significance across all the sites and of special 
concern to commissioners. Methods to prove attribution were linked to ensuring investor 
confidence. The Trailblazers display a diversity of approaches to the question of attribution, 
with some drawing on contemporaneous control groups, and others on historical control 
groups or measurements against a baseline (at an arbitrary point in time). Important factors 
that influenced these decisions related to the novelty of the intervention and contrasting 
experiences around the potential to access and use reliable data sources. More specifically, 
proposed comparisons relate to whether a trailblazer has access to expertise in evaluation 
design and data management to (e.g. capacity to have contemporaneous matched 
comparisons as in Peterborough) and funds to cover the cost of the intervention in parallel 
with the budget for the service itself. These choices reflect a trade-off between simplicity 
and robustness. 
 
The negotiations around the outcome measurement parts of the contract are crucial in 
relation to the avoidance of outcome disputes at a later juncture, and, again, all relevant 
parties need to be equally signed up to what will be measured and how this will be done 
from the beginning. There are also time considerations: although SIBs may operate over 
long timescales in many instances, there may be a need to demonstrate effectiveness 
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relatively early in the life of a contract – especially given the length of the negotiations that 
are required to get to the start of a project: 
 
“One of the challenges in arriving at a Social Impact Bond is that the time it takes to 
develop the partnerships, to actually go through, just even getting to the co-diagnosis 
stage and then going through the co-design stage is taking time. That is the 
challenge. Then even if you're doing one year’s delivery, you're looking at somewhere 
between two to three years to get to a point where you might be able to demonstrate 
some attribution [of impact].” (Provider 10) 
 
A further point is that whilst proving that an outcome can be attributed to the service may 
be one issue, it is not necessarily clear that achieving this outcome will lead to cashable 
savings given the pressure on health and social care services and/or where in the system the 
savings become apparent. As a result, some providers questioned whether savings 
attributable to SIB interventions would be made available for community sector investment 
at a later date, or if these savings might be used elsewhere.  
 
In one site, changes to data protection laws have made it impossible (for the foreseeable 
future) to access identifiable hospital episode statistics (HES) data to demonstrate the 
provider’s actual progress against the performance metric. In this case, the commissioner 
had issued payments based on predicted performance targets on the proviso that this might 
need to be adjusted at a later date, in order to preserve relationships at the centre of the 
SIB – again highlighting the need for compromise.  
 
There are two further points of interest here: firstly that small scale projects face a 
particular challenge in regard to providing definitive evidence of attributable results: 
 
“I know that a technical problem was we’ve got such a small number of patients that 
we would really struggle to achieve a statistically significant result. We’d have to 
have an enormous impact and I don’t believe we would have.” (Provider 4) 
 
And secondly, that, if the goals of larger projects are particularly innovative, then building a 
robust evaluation into the design of the SIB is especially important, but also potentially time 
consuming, complicated and expensive, adding to the transaction costs associated with the 
SIB.  
 
Findings from operational SIBs 
 
The two SIB initiatives that have been established and are currently providing services – in 
Essex and Thames Reach, London – offer some indications as to what is required to 
implement a SIB in practice. The first finding relates to the importance of building data 
management capacity ahead of project implementation, alongside workforce development, 
to ensure adherence to stringent new data requirements. The second relates to the 
importance of collaborative working between parties and amongst service providers to 
ensure programme success.  
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In both SIBs, the importance of improving data management capacity and training at the 
service provider level was identified as crucial to successful implementation and later 
performance measurement for outcome payments. Thames Reach interviewees suggested 
that the project would have benefitted from an additional staff member to ensure accuracy 
in claims for outcome payments, for example.  Small issues such as inconsistencies in date 
recording (DD/MM/YY versus MM/DD/YY) caused some data to go unrecorded, leading to 
lower than expected outcome payments in one quarter. A single database coordinator could 
have benefitted the team through internal capacity building and ensured that there were no 
data inconsistencies. In Essex, a special purpose vehicle is responsible for performance 
management and monitoring. Despite the presence of this third party ‘regulator’, there 
were still issues with a lack of analytical capacity and data systems, which contributed to 
unexpected delays and hidden costs (Commissioner 1). Moreover, other delays could be 
caused by lags, for instance, in availability of education data, and access to certain datasets 
such as police and offending data. 
 
A second insight is the importance of collaborative project development involving all the key 
parties and ongoing engagement between them. In Essex, strong provider partnerships 
were seen as crucial to the implementation of the project, with one interviewee saying that 
regular meetings between the various parties helped to facilitate multi-way communication 
(Intermediary 1). The level of collaboration was viewed positively. In rough sleeping, Thames 
Reach holds quarterly meetings with commissioners, service providers and investors to 
share lessons and case studies about progress towards outcomes  
 
A final insight, specific to Thames Reach, was the positive experience reported by service 
providers and commissioners associated with the outcome-based intervention. In Thames 
Reach, the main benefit of the new programme was seen as the greater flexibility in service 
provision enabled by the SIB provider contract. This was warmly welcomed by the providers, 
commissioners and investors. It appears that a combination of persistent and flexible service 
delivery was leading to unexpected success amongst even deeply entrenched rough 
sleepers. However, two parties suggested that the targets for outcome payments relating to 
education, employment or volunteering were set too high given the problems facing the 
target population and should be revised downward if these outcomes are to be used in 
future tenders for SIB-related services for people sleeping rough.  
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6.  Discussion 
 
 
The findings of this interim report are focused on the SIB Trailblazers’ development process, 
especially in the early stages of negotiation and implementation. The Trailblazers vary in 
their objectives, target populations and progress towards a contract, but have similar 
motivations, experiences of negotiations and issues relating to determining and attributing 
outcomes.  
 
The literature review found a diverse literature on the potential application of SIBs to public 
policy issues.  The role of public, private and not-for-profit values, potential impacts upon 
measurement systems alongside risk and financial incentives were central themes that 
emerged from this literature.  Very little empirical data about SIBs exists; most of the 
empirical work was qualitative and mostly concerned with the Peterborough SIB. The 
empirical studies highlighted firstly, the high transaction costs and policy complexity in 
establishing a SIB; secondly, difficulties in the measurement of outcomes; and thirdly, the 
potential for innovative practice and improvement in outcomes.  
 
 
Overview of findings from the Trailblazers 
 
Contractual relationships vary 
 
The SIB Trailblazers tackle a variety of health/social policy areas and have made varying 
amounts of progress towards a signed contract.  As of December 2014 the moment, two are 
operational, five remain in negotiation, one was funded directly by government and one has 
been abandoned.  Progress towards a signed SIB contract was linked to common issues 
around negotiation complexity, for example of delays in the commissioning process as 
multiple new stakeholders were brought together.  There is a diversity of planned SIB 
models among the Trailblazers when compared to the Cabinet Office’s working model (see 
Figure 6.1, below).   
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Figure 6.1:  Cabinet Office diagram of how a SIB could work 
 
Source: Cabinet Office 2014, https://www.gov.uk/social-impact-bonds 
 
The approaches detailed in Chapter 4 of this report suggest that there is no ‘typical health 
and social care SIB model’ identified so far. Rather, proposed contractual relationships 
differed based on local partnerships, service provider preferences, and commissioner 
comfort with the model and investment sources.  For example, we found that some of the 
models under development proposed to operate with, or, without SPVs depending on 
provider preferences - some received direct investment to fund a service while others used 
the SPV model to contract or subcontract other providers.  Some SIBs appear to have 
‘double’ P4P structures where both the financier and provider are paid, at least in part, on 
outcomes while others are not structured this way, with just the private investor receiving a 
share of profits and return on capital In several cases, different levels and sources of funding 
were obtained from private, public or philanthropic funds in addition to, or in lieu of, private 
or social investment, although an outcomes-based contract was still present. 
 
However, the flexibility of the SIB model was often seen as advantageous by informants as it 
fostered local approaches to specific problems and allowed innovation in financing 
initiatives that might otherwise have been too risky (e.g. to test the link between social 
isolation and loneliness with improved health outcomes in Worcester).  Nonetheless, such 
diversity makes generalization more difficult when proposing learning points for other 
future health and social care SIBs.  The variety of models may do little to lessen the 
transaction costs and negotiation process for future SIBs.   
 
We will learn more about the implications of these different models as more of the 
Trailblazers become operational.  It may be that certain models show themselves as easier 
to manage economically, better at minimising potential conflicts of interest and/or more 
strongly encourage better provider performance than others.  
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Complexity of SIB negotiations 
 
SIBs appear to be more complex than traditional financing mechanisms in health and social 
care services. There are high transaction costs due to the host of new considerations to 
accommodate the multiple players involved in designing and developing SIBs. Negotiations 
appear in many instances to be time-consuming. It is possible that there may be 
downstream advantages for these projects, as the effort expended to establish clear 
contracts can enable a smoother running process.  It is also possible that future SIBs can 
benefit from Trailblazer learnings to minimise difficulties in future negotiation processes.  
The role of specialized intermediary groups appears critical to many SIB negotiations.  
However, this raises questions around conflicts of interest and market dominance while 
there are few such intermediaries. There are issues around asymmetries of information as 
intermediaries hold specialist knowledge and may potentially use it to inappropriately sway 
the negotiation process. Access to development funding is frequently important for SIB 
progress, but often takes a long time to obtain and may slow, or in some cases halt, the 
process.  
 
The complexity of negotiations is frequently linked to the need for intense analysis of the 
assumptions and data on which the SIB proposal is based.  This includes making such 
analyses widely available so all parties can test or see the assumptions in order to build trust 
in the models.  It may include developing a deeper understanding of issues associated with 
an intervention than may have been the case in the past.  
 
Motivations 
 
Most Trailblazers are commissioner-driven, and developed in partnership with other actors 
with one of two goals: to develop innovative services; or, to ‘scale up’ existing interventions. 
Service providers were drawn to SIBs that offered innovative approaches, via payment for 
performance, for perceived financial freedom, opportunities to explore preventive care 
models, multi-year contracts and flexibility in delivery. Commissioners and providers were 
interested in exploring SIB funding because they viewed payment for performance as the 
route forward for public services commissioning.  At the macro level, SIBs allow 
commissioners to pilot new service models or defer taking financial responsibility for 
innovative or risky projects that require testing before scaling up or disseminating.  
 
Motivations for SIB programming varied by type of informant, with service providers and 
intermediaries having strong pro-social motivations.  A few commissioners held less positive 
views about SIBs as a funding mechanism for health and social care programming.  Their 
reservations were largely due to the transaction costs involved in setting up SIBs and in 
negotiating reasonable rates of return.  SIBs present potential financial freedom and room 
for service providers to provide innovative services.  Commissioners seem happy to 
accommodate this as they are widely seen as risk-free (although financial risk for failure is 
shifted to private investors, such interventions cannot be entirely risk free), though a few 
commissioners were wary of being complicit in the fragmentation and outsourcing of public 
services.   
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Measurement  
 
SIBs affect the amount, type and importance of data collection and performance 
measurement for service providers with the intent of increasing the potential accountability 
of SIB projects. A shift to a focus on outcomes was welcomed by all informants and seen as 
a strong advantage of a SIB approach to policy making. However, in health and social care it 
was noted that cross-sector commissioning may complicate discussions on how to measure 
and what to measure. Informants had limited understanding of, and interest in, the well-
known potential and actual drawbacks of payment for performance contracts in health and 
social care.   
 
SIBs raise real issues of outcome attribution which the early data from the Trailblazers 
suggests will be an important element of ongoing research. A key finding was the often 
missing link between outcome attribution and likely cost savings.  While it remains to be 
proven that an outcome can be attributed to a specific service, it was often unclear that this 
would yield cashable savings to ease pressure on health and/or social care budgets, or 
where in the system the savings could become apparent.  As a result, some providers 
questioned whether savings attributable to SIB interventions should be made available for 
community sector investment at a later date, rather than benefiting private financiers, 
 
Learning from the operational SIBs 
  
Two of the operational SIB Trailblazers highlighted two aspects of successful 
implementation relevant to the other Trailblazers.  Firstly, it is important to proceed with 
clarity around data requirements and increase internal or external capacity ahead of project 
launch to ensure that the outcome can be attributed to the service or intervention so 
successes and barriers to outcome achievement can be addressed.  Secondly, collaborative 
working between all parties is important at every stage of the project to ensure good 
communication.  
 
Priorities for future research 
 
As the literature review for this evaluation has shown, there is a need for empirical research 
into SIBs, especially in health and social care, where little is known about how SIBs are likely 
to function. Indeed, the earliest applications of SIB projects were in the areas of recidivism 
or employment and training policies so we are limited in what policy lessons can be applied 
to health and social care. Despite a lack of empirical data on outcomes and costs of SIBs in 
health and social care, there has been no shortage of national and local enthusiasm for the 
development of further projects.  To accompany this, qualitative research is needed to 
explore how SIB delivery affects service recipients, service providers and joint 
commissioners. There is also scope to explore the interactions between those actors by 
focusing on how their perceptions of competing values are challenged by new systems of 
measurement, financial incentives and conceptions of risk.   
 
Quantitative research is also needed to explore the effectiveness of SIB projects in meeting 
their oft-stated goals of improving accountability, scaling up projects that work with service 
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providers most attuned to the needs of vulnerable populations and ensuring value for 
money for public commissioners and grant-giving organisations.  In the US, it appears that 
most SIBs have been implemented in the context of a RCT.  This is not the case with the 
Trailblazers.  While the RCT is not the only appropriate evaluation technique for a SIB, it 
highlights the need for robust evaluations based on appropriate counterfactuals or control 
groups to demonstrate effectiveness.  It is planned to attempt to undertake such 
comparative qualitative and quantitative work during the next stage of this evaluation.  
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Appendix: Further profile information on the Trailblazers 
 
 
Data collection – interviews 
 
SIB project Providers Commissioners Intermediaries Investors Other TOTAL 
Sandwell 1 2 2   5 
Leeds 3  1   4 
Cornwall 2  1   3 
Worcester 1  1   2 
Thames Reach 1 1 1 1  4 
Newcastle  1  1 3 5 
Manchester 1 1 1   3 
Green Dreams     1 1 
Shared Lives   1  1 2 
Essex 1 1 1   3 
Non-trailblazer 1  2  1 4 
TOTAL 11   6 11 2 6 36  
 
 
SIB development 
 
SIB project Who initiated the 
SIB idea? 
Is Social Finance involved (and 
in what capacity)? 
Stage of development (as of December 
2014) 
Sandwell Government 
agencies, Social 
Finance, MCCC 
Yes – development of SIB and 
now partnership with MCCC 
Out to tender 
Leeds Deep Green CIC Small amount of advice Terminated  
Cornwall 
CCG/VCS 
organisations 
Advice on outcomes and 
identifying metrics 
Bridge funding received from Cabinet 
Office’s Social Action Team to extend SIB-like 
project into East Cornwall.  Money to be 
used by end of this financial year. 
Worcester 
Worcester City 
Council 
Yes, actively involved in co-
design with service provider 
Tender submitted in October 2014, preferred 
bidder to be announced February 2015. 
Thames Reach 
Greater London 
Authority 
Yes, through advisory services 
to GLA 
Started in November 2012 
Newcastle VONNE No Expected to start in April 2015 
Manchester 
Manchester City 
Council 
commissioned SF to 
conduct feasibility 
study 
Yes. Conducted feasibility 
study, and on-going advisory 
role 
Started in October/November 2014 
Green Dreams NA NA This scheme is not a SIB 
Shared Lives 
Shared Lives Plus Yes, as part of the Shared Lives 
Incubator 
 Manchester expected April 2015; Lambeth 
expected to start in June 2015) 
Essex Social Finance Yes, through advisory services Started in April 2013 
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SIB focus 
 
SIB project Is the focus of the SIB 
cross-sectoral? 
Does the government 
already fund similar 
services? 
Are the services 
proposed innovative? 
Are the proposed 
savings actual or 
potential? 
Sandwell No – just health Yes The combination is Potential  
Leeds Yes No Yes Potential 
Cornwall Yes Yes Somewhat Potential 
Worcester Yes No Somewhat Potential 
Thames Reach 
Yes Not across all 
outcome metrics 
Yes Potential 
Newcastle Yes Yes Yes Potential 
Manchester Yes Yes No Actual 
Green Dreams NA NA NA NA 
Shared Lives No Yes Yes Actual 
Essex Yes Yes No Actual 
 
SIB evaluation of outcomes 
 
SIB project Existing data or new 
data collection? 
Type of outcomes 
(relative improvement, 
absolute, incremental, 
etc) 
Type of evaluation of 
outcomes 
(before/after, with 
control group, etc.) 
Is this a robust method 
to attribute effects to 
services provided under 
SIB? 
Sandwell Existing data and new 
data 
Absolute Before/After Yes 
Leeds New data Relative improvement Before/After ? 
Cornwall 
Existing and new data Absolute proposed Before/After Pending results of 
Penwith 
Worcester Existing and new data Absolute Before/After ? 
Thames Reach 
Existing and new data Absolute Before/After, potential 
for control group to be 
constructed 
? 
Newcastle 
 
Existing and new data 
Absolute improvement 
on Wellbeing Star; 
Relative improvement 
on other outcomes 
Ongoing reviews with 
the patient through use 
of a Wellbeing Star  and 
secondary care 
outcomes compared to 
control group 
No 
Manchester 
Existing data Absolute Young person engaged 
in MTFC-A programme, 
moved out of residential 
placement, achieving all 
wellbeing outcomes 
(wellbeing is measured 
at graduation and 12 
months after 
graduation). Benchmark 
is data on 11-14 year-
olds in residential care 
from 2007 to 2008 
No 
Green Dreams NA NA NA NA 
Shared Lives 
New data  Absolute Number of new Shared 
Lives care placements 
established 
No 
Essex 
Existing and new data  Relative to a historical 
control group (baseline 
is absolute as it is 
historical data) 
At the end of each 
measurement quarter a 
comparison with 
historical case file data 
is made 
Potentially 
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Contractual model 
 
SIB project Type of involvement 
of intermediary in SIB 
(especially support for 
performance 
management?) 
Commissioners (to) 
contract with… 
Contractual 
relationship between 
investors and service 
providers? 
Is the service provider 
bearing part of the 
financial risk (i.e. paid 
partly based on  
outcomes) 
Sandwell Would depend on who 
won contract 
Unclear at this stage Unclear at this stage Would depend on who 
won contract – but 
probably, based on 
documentation 
available 
Leeds N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cornwall 
Assisted with 
identification of 
outcome metrics 
N/A N/A Unlikely 
Worcester 
High, co-design of 
service model, 
assistance in 
developing tender 
Service provider and 
investors (to be 
identified) 
To be confirmed To be confirmed 
Thames Reach 
Provided technical 
assistance to 
commissioner only 
Service provider, 
investors 
Yes Yes 
Newcastle 
VONNE acted as de 
facto intermediary 
and provided office 
space and other 
administrative support 
SPV No Partially 
Manchester 
Conducted feasibility 
study, and on-going 
advisory role 
Service provider  Yes Yes 
Green Dreams NA NA NA NA 
Shared Lives 
Through Shared Lives 
Incubator 
Service provider Yes Yes 
Essex Advisory services SPV No Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 89 
 
 
Who invests in SIBs? 
 
SIB project Size of investment Type of investors 
involved (with %) – 
public, charities, 
social investors 
Rate of return? Were investors not 
interested / turned 
down? 
Sandwell Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear 
Leeds N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cornwall Unclear ?All Cabinet Office N/A Unclear 
Worcester 
Approximately £1.7m. 
Exact amount to be 
confirmed. 
TBD TBD Not at that stage 
Thames Reach 
£2.5m Thames Reach, Big 
Issue, other 
philanthropic 
Not disclosed Bridges withdrew, risk 
deemed too high 
Newcastle 
£1.7m Bridges Ventures and 
the Newcastle 
Healthcare Charity.  
This is a fully at risk 
investment and there 
is no fixed coupon or 
secured level of 
return.   
Unknown 
Manchester 
£1.2m Bridges Ventures: 
£1.2m 
To be confirmed Unknown 
Green Dreams NA NA NA NA 
Shared Lives 
£1.1M to cover four 
areas. 
 Big Society Capital, 
Esmeé Fairbairn 
foundation, John 
Ellerman Foundation 
To be confirmed Unknown 
Essex 
£3.1m Including Bridges 
Ventures: £825,000 
and Big Society 
Capital: £825,000 
To be confirmed Unknown 
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The Policy Innovation Research Unit (PIRU) brings together leading health 
and social care expertise to improve evidence-based policy-making and 
its implementation across the National Health Service, social care and 
public health. 
 
We strengthen early policy development by exploiting the best routine data 
and by subjecting initiatives to speedy, thorough evaluation. We also help 
to optimise policy implementation across the Department of Health’s 
responsibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Our partners 
PIRU is a novel collaboration between the London School of Hygiene & Tropical 
Medicine (LSHTM), the Personal Social Services Research Unit (PSSRU) at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and the Health and 
Care Infrastructure Research and Innovation Centre (HaCIRIC) at Imperial College 
London Business School plus RAND Europe and the Nuffield Trust. 
 
The Unit is funded by the Policy Research Programme of the Department of Health. 
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